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 This study examines teachers’ beliefs in the nature and malleability of intelligence, 
how these beliefs may vary in different academic domains, and whether those beliefs have 
any significant relationships with teachers’ self-efficacy beliefs, epistemological beliefs, and 
proposed interventions for struggling students. Findings showed that teachers exhibited a 
more fixed view of the nature of intelligence when survey items were framed in terms of 
math, not language arts or domain-general items. There was also evidence suggesting that 
teachers’ beliefs in the fixed entity nature of intelligence are significantly correlated with 
holding a traditional unidimensional conception of intelligence. However, little evidence was 
found indicating a relationship between teachers’ various beliefs and their proposed strategies 
for struggling students. The results have implications for research on lay conceptions of intel-
ligence, and for teacher education curricula.  
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 Teachers’ beliefs about the nature and malleability of intelligence are important be-
cause these conceptions play a role in how teachers evaluate their students’ intelligence and 
academic achievement (Calderhead, 1996; Pajares, 1992; Richardson & Placier, 2001). This 
may affect their expectations of students and teaching methods (Fang, 1996; Fives & Buehl, 
2010). Often, teacher education programs include in their curriculum formal or scientific the-
ories of intelligence that emphasize factors, components, and related constructs. Scientific 
theories of intelligence are an essential component of teacher education programs because 
these theories function as a basis for the assessment of students’ intelligence and academic 
abilities that teachers are expected to perform.  
  In addition to developing formal theories of intelligence, researchers in psychology 
(e.g., Cantor, 1978; Neisser, 1979; Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981; Wober, 1974) 
have started to investigate and highlight the importance of lay beliefs, or implicit theories 
(Sternberg et al., 1981), of intelligence. Lay beliefs about intelligence are defined by individ-
uals’ expressed beliefs about intelligence, not data from individual’s performance on specific 
tasks (Sternberg et al., 1981). In other words, research on lay beliefs of intelligence focuses 
on the identification or reconstruction of individuals’ existing beliefs or theories, not on 
building new theories. These lay beliefs are important because they guide how individuals 
judge, assess, and evaluate themselves and other individuals in the real world, including 
teachers and parents (Fry, 1984; Sternberg et al., 1981). In the case of teachers, their lay be-
liefs about intelligence, whether affected by formal instruction or not, function as a basis for 
everyday informal assessments and training of students’ intelligence and academic ability 
(Cacioppo, 2002; Calderhead, 1996; Hale & Fiorello, 2004; Pajares, 1992; Richardson &  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Placier, 2001; Weiner, 1985). Therefore, teachers’ beliefs about intelligence are of great im-
portance to educators, students, and the general public.  
Rationale and Purpose of the Study 
 Much recent research related to lay beliefs of intelligence has focused on investigat-
ing how students’ beliefs influence their academic performance (Fang, 1996). While the ma-
jority of the research on intelligence beliefs has been conducted with students, recently, some 
researchers have demonstrated an interest in examining preservice and in-service teachers’ 
beliefs and how these beliefs may or may not influence their teaching methodology (Fang, 
1996; Fives & Buehl, 2010). Because teachers are professionals who make decisions within a 
complex and uncertain environment, their thoughts, beliefs, and judgments influence not only 
how they teach, but how they evaluate students (Fang, 1996; Shavelson & Stern, 1981; Tickle 
et al., 2005). Thus, it is surprising that so little attention has been paid to teachers’ expressed 
beliefs about intelligence and potential consequences that these beliefs may bring.  
 The intent of the present study is to examine teachers’ expressed beliefs in the nature 
and malleability of intelligence, how these beliefs may vary in different academic domains, 
and whether those beliefs have any significant relationships with teachers’ self-efficacy be-
liefs, epistemological beliefs, and proposed strategies for struggling students. Teachers’ self-
efficacy will be investigated because teachers’ assessment of students’ intelligence and po-
tential success in the classroom may also be influenced by teachers’ assessment of their own 
abilities. Similarly, teachers’ epistemological beliefs, as defined by Chan and Elliot (2004), 
will also be investigated because teachers’ beliefs about intelligence may be affected by how 
teachers’ perceive knowledge acquisition. 
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 To do so, the present study will be conducted in two parts. The first part will investi-
gate the general population’s lay beliefs about intelligence in order to develop an attribute 
importance rating measure for teachers. The second part of the study will investigate whether 
teachers’ beliefs about the nature and malleability of intelligence differ from those of the 
general population, whether teachers’ beliefs about intelligence differ across academic sub-
jects (specifically in math and language arts), whether there are any relationships between 
teachers’ various beliefs, and whether any of those beliefs correlate with strategies teachers 
propose for struggling students. These questions are important because these types of teacher 
beliefs may influence their teaching methodology (Calderhead, 1996; Fang, 1996; Fives & 
Buehl, 2010; Pajares, 1992; Richardson & Placier, 2001), their students’ beliefs about intelli-
gence (Patterson, Kravchenko, Chen-Bouck & Kelley, 2016), and their preferred feedback for 




Research Question 0: What do people selected from the general population believe are the 
attributes characterizing an intelligent person? 
Study II 
Research Question 1A: Do teachers rate the importance of the selected attributes of an intel-
ligent person differently than the general population? 
Research Question 1B: Do teachers have different beliefs about the malleability of intelli-
gence compared to the general population?  
Research Question 2: Do teachers believe that the malleability of intelligence can differ and 
be at least somewhat independent from one subject area to another (Math & Language Arts)?  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Research Question 3: Are teachers’ epistemological and self-efficacy beliefs related to their 
beliefs about the malleability of intelligence, in general and across subject areas? 
Research Question 4: Do teachers’ proposed strategies for helping struggling students differ 
across different subject areas and are any such differences related to their beliefs about intel-
ligence across different subjects? 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 This chapter presents existing studies on formal and lay beliefs of intelligence in the 
general public, and specifically, among teachers. 
Formal Models of Intelligence 
 Early attempts to measure intelligence gave rise to a number of different types of the-
ories (Sternberg & Detterman, 1986). Existing intelligence theories can be categorized into 
three general types based on how the construct of intelligence was construed. The first type of 
theory posits the existence of a single general factor of intelligence, which underlies all adap-
tive behavior. The second general type includes theories that indicated that there is more than 
one general type of intelligence, or in other words, that there are different dimensions or 
types of intelligence. The third and final type includes theories that propose that intelligence 
should be perceived not merely as a multiple, but a multi-level construct. The next section 
summarizes these different viewpoints in more detail. 
Modern Unitary Theories about the Nature of Intelligence 
 Spearman’s Two-Factor Theory.  
 One of the earliest and most influential theories emerged from an emphasis on a uni-
tary concept of general ability proposed by Charles Spearman. Spearman’s two-factor theory 
(1904, 1927) was derived from the process of investigating data processed by a new statisti-
cal technique, factor analysis, which identifies latent variables underlying observed variables 
in test performance. Using factor analysis, Spearman discovered that when the data were fac-
tor-analyzed with a correlation matrix, two types of latent factors appeared, a general factor 
known as the g factor and a set of specific abilities known as the s factor (Spearman, 1904, 
1927). The g factor is perceived as a unitary, biological, and inherited determinant of measur-  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able intellectual differences whereas the s factor is perceived as a set of specific abilities, 
such as athletic aptitude, that contributed to exceptional performances in specific areas. This 
implies that Spearman believed that people are either intelligent, average, or unintelligent, 
depending of their inherent levels of general intelligence.  
 However, Spearman’s idea of an inherent, general intelligence was challenged by ri-
val interpretations from G. Thomson (1939), E. L. Thorndike (1926), and L. L. Thurstone 
(1938, 1947), who all claimed that there is not a single intelligence, but rather multiple intel-
ligences. 
 Theories of Bonds and Connections.  
 One of Spearman’s main critics was Sir Godfrey Thomson, who accepted Spearman’s 
statistical technique, but not his interpretation of factors. Thomson (1939) claimed that a gen-
eral factor could arise from a battery of intelligence assessments because each of the tasks 
found in Spearman’s assessments required certain mental skills. For example, if each assess-
ment samples all of these mental skills, then they will always appear to correlate because they 
co-occur, which will give rise to the appearance of a single general factor when there may, in 
fact, be multiple.  
 In a similar vein, Thorndike and colleagues (1926) proposed that intelligence depend-
ed on the number of learned connections. Specifically, intelligence was manifested through 
an accumulation of neural bonds or connections formed through learning experiences. Be-
cause the content of intellect was perceived as a function of specific experience, Thorndike 
believed that any measure of intelligence independent of cultural background was impossible.  
 While Thurstone, like Spearman, was an advocate of using factor analysis, Thurstone 
(1938, 1947) believed that rotation of factorial axes could help uncover a cleaner factor pat-
tern matrix. Using a simple-structure rotation, Thurstone (1941) argued that rather than a sin-  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gle general intelligence, there were seven primary mental abilities, namely word fluency, 
number facility, verbal comprehension, perceptual speed, associative memory, spatial visual-
ization, and inductive reasoning. 
Modern Non-Unitary Theories about the Nature of Intelligence 
 More recently, a series of theories have emerged that reject Spearman’s unitary con-
ception of intelligence in favor of theories that focus on more than just the cognitive aspect of 
intelligence.  
 Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences.  
 One of the most influential critics of Spearman’s unitary conception of intelligence, 
especially in education research, is Howard Gardner (1983), who believes that the classical 
view of intelligence reflects a bias towards academics. For instance, the intelligence we 
commonly refer to is narrowly defined, and focuses primarily on a range of logic and mathe-
matical abilities. Gardner challenged the unitary concept of intelligence by proposing a theo-
ry of multiple intelligences based on the differential cognitive processing required for demon-
stration of the intelligent or creative performance in different areas (Gardner, 1993). Specifi-
cally, Gardner’s theory introduced eight intelligences, namely linguistic, musical, logical-
mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinaesthetic, personal, naturalist, and spiritualist intelligences. 
Gardner further argued that each of these skills should be valued as highly as the traditional 
academic conception of intelligence (Gardner, Kornhaber, & Wake, 1996). Although Gard-
ner’s multiple intelligences model has received widespread recognition and has been widely 
adopted in schools (Gardner, 1993), more substantial support using empirical data is needed 
before the theory can be generally accepted (Sternberg, 1999). Nonetheless, this theory has 
made a valuable contribution to the literature on intelligence by suggesting an alternative to 
the unitary g factor theory.  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 Sternberg’s Triarchic Theory of Intelligence.  
 Around the same time Gardner proposed his theory of multiple intelligences, Stern-
berg (1985, 1997) proposed a theory of successful intelligence, consisting of three types of 
intelligence: analytical, creative, and practical. Analytical intelligence is involved when ap-
plied to analyze, evaluate, and judge. This was measured (in Sternberg’s earlier work) by 
people’s response times and error rates when given analytical problems, such as analogies or 
syllogisms (Sternberg, 1977, 1983), and remains the type of intelligence that is tested most 
often (Sternberg, 1997). Creative intelligence is characterized by insight, synthesis, and the 
ability to appropriately respond to novel situations. Lastly, practical intelligence involves the 
ability to solve real-life problems and was measured via the concept of tacit knowledge, 
which was defined as the knowledge for someone to work effectively and efficiently in an 
unfamiliar environment (Sternberg, 1997).  
Modern Hierarchical Theories about the Nature of Intelligence 
 Combining both unitary and multiple conceptions of intelligence, theories with multi-
level structures were conceived to resolve this century-long debate about the dimensionality 
of intelligence. 
 Cattell’s Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Abilities.  
 Raymond Cattell, following in the tradition of Spearman and Thorndike, proposed a 
quasi-hierarchical model of intelligence with a general intelligence factor at the top of the 
hierarchy and two factors beneath it, fluid and crystallized intelligence.  
 In Cattell’s earlier publications, Cattell (1943) defined fluid intelligence as “a purely 
general ability to discriminate and perceive relations between any fundaments, new or 
old” (p. 178). Crystallized intelligence, however, was perceived as a set of “discriminatory 
habits long established in a particular field” that were originally acquired through the opera-  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tion of fluid intelligence (p. 178). The primary difference between these two factors was that 
fluid intelligence emphasized process whereas crystallized intelligence focused more on the 
product through which the process produced. 
 Cattell’s theory was later expanded by Horn (1985), who suggested that there may be 
ten second-order factors, which included two deep processing factors (fluid and crystallized 
intelligences), three perceptual organizational factors (visualization, clerical speed, and audi-
tory thinking), three processing factors (short-term acquisition and long-term storage and re-
trieval, and accurate decision speed), and two sensory reception factors (visual sensory detec-
tion and auditory sensory detection). Although the model with additional second-order factors 
was, according to Horn (1985), purely speculative, this revised model summarized and in-
cluded much of what is known about the organization of human abilities (Carroll, 1993). 
 Carroll’s Three-Stratum Theory.  
 One of the currently most widely accepted hierarchical models was proposed by Car-
roll (1993) based on the reanalysis of datasets from the past 60 years of factor-analytic stud-
ies on human intelligence. Carroll (1993) proposed a hierarchical theory with a general intel-
ligence factor at the top, various broad abilities sandwiched in the middle (including fluid and 
crystallized intelligences, learning and memory processes, visual and auditory perception, 
facile production, and speed), and specific abilities at the bottom of the hierarchy. According 
to Carroll (1993), the current consensus regarding intelligence is that the inclusion of a g fac-
tor leads to a better factor structure when interpreting findings obtained from intelligence as-
sessments. This consensus is backed up by the fact that Thurstone’s proposed seven primary 
mental abilities correlate with each other, therefore allowing these constructs to be factor-ana-
lyzed, which in turn, produce a general factor (i.e., a factor that all the tests are correlated 
with).  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 Cattell-Horn-Carroll Theory.  
 The Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) Theory was extended by McGrew (1997, 2012) by 
combining two similar theories about the content and structure of cognitive abilities. One of 
the two theories is Cattell’s Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Abilities (Cattell, 1941; Horn, 
1985). The other theory is derived from Carroll’s (1993) Three-Stratum Theory, which was 
developed by synthesizing 60 years of past research on the nature, identification, and struc-
ture of cognitive abilities. Thus far, the CHC Theory is known as one of the most comprehen-
sive model of intelligence based on psychological theories of human cognitive abilities. Be-
cause of the sheer number of distinct differences in cognitive ability, the CHC theory catego-
rizes these abilities into three strata: stratum I, “narrow” abilities; stratum II, “broad” abili-
ties, and stratum III, “general ability.” The g factor is at the top of the hierarchy with nine 
broad abilities and over 70 narrow abilities under it. Broad abilities include (1) comprehen-
sion-knowledge (i.e., breadth and depth of a person’s acquired knowledge, ability to commu-
nicate one’s knowledge, and the ability to reason using previously learned experiences), (2) 
fluid reasoning (i.e., the ability to reason, form concepts, and solve problems using innova-
tive procedures), (3) qualitative knowledge (i.e., the ability to comprehend quantitative con-
cepts and relationships), (4) reading and writing ability (i.e., basic reading and writing skills), 
(5) short-term memory (i.e., the ability to apprehend and hold immediate information and use 
it within a few seconds), (6) long-term memory (i.e. the ability to store information and re-
trieve it later), (7) visual processing (i.e., the ability to perceive, analyze, syntehsize, and 
think with visual representations), (8) auditory processing (i.e., the ability to analyze, synthe-
size, and discriminate auditory stimuli), and (9) processing speed (i.e., the ability to perform 
cognitive tasks). Narrow abilities under each of the nine broad abilities are listed under Ap  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pendix A (Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 1941; Horn, 1965; McGrew, 2005; Schneider & McGrew, 
2012).   
Nature vs. Nurture 
 Prior to the 20th century, the primary debate about human intelligence was between 
two schools of thought. The first school believes that intelligence reflects input from a source 
that is internally derived and independent from personal experiences in the world. In contrast, 
the second school argues that intelligence reflects input from a source that is externally de-
rived from personal experiences in the world. It was not until the 20th century that empirical-
ly grounded interactionaist rationales transcending the nature-nurture distinction emerged 
throughout the life sciences, from genetics to the philosophy of science (for reviews, see 
Blumberg, 2005; Oyama, 2000). In this section, evidence from the nature, nurture, and inter-
actionist perspectives will be discussed. 
The Nature Perspective 
  It has long been acknowledged that certain physical characteristics are biologically 
determined by genetic inheritance. For example, traits such as eye and skin color are all a 
function of the genes people inherit. Proponents of the nature perspective take it further to 
say that traits such as intelligence are also predetermined by genes.  
 Evidence supporting the nature perspective was primarily based on results from twins 
studies. These studies recruit both identical and fraternal twins to measure the level of corre-
lation between their IQs. Both identical and fraternal twins were used because identical twins 
share 100 percent of their genes whereas fraternal twins share only 50 percent. Therefore, if 
genetic factors are important in regard to intelligence, identical twins’ IQ correlation should 
be higher than that of fraternal twins’. As predicted, results consistently indicate that identical  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twins show an average IQ correlation of 0.75, which is greater than that of fraternal 
twins’ (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997).  
 Another popular technique to untangle the relative effects of genes and environment 
in intelligence is by comparing the IQ of adopted twins raised in different families. If genetics 
play a larger part in intelligence, then the intelligence level between identical twins raised in 
different environments should remain similar. On the other hand, if environment plays a larg-
er part in intelligence, then the intelligence level between fraternal twins raised in the same 
environment should be strikingly similar, regardless of the fact that they only share 50 per-
cent of the same genes. Results from these twin adoption studies reinforce the conclusion 
drawn from the original twin studies. In other words, identical twins raised in separate envi-
ronments are still more similar in their IQ levels than fraternal twins raised together (Burton, 
Weston, Kowalski, 2012). These studies indicate that genetic factors have a stronger influ-
ence on people’s intelligence than environmental factors. 
The Nurture Perspective 
 On the other side of the debate, proponents of the nurture perspective believes that 
intelligence is heavily influenced by environmental factors, such as education, socioeconomic 
status, nutrition, and even the amount of time spent watching television (Flynn, 1992).  
 Evidence that support the nurture perspective also derived from the same twin and 
twin adoption studies used by proponents of the nature perspective. For example, the fact that 
identical twins’ IQ levels are not completely identical is evidence that the environment must 
have had some impact on intelligence. Studies conducted on interracial adopted children have 
also shown that the IQ levels of black children improve significantly after being adopted by 
white, middle-class families (Williams & Ceci, 1997). For example, on average, the IQ of 
black children increased from 83 to 103 after being adopted by families they have no genetic  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association with (Williams & Ceci, 1997). These results could be explained by various envi-
ronmental factors, be it schooling, opportunity, number of books available, or diet.  
The Interactionist Perspective 
 One of the earliest psychologists to oppose the nature-nurture distinction was Zing-
Yang Kuo. Throughout the 1920s, Kuo objected to components of both concepts because he 
believed that this nature-nurture distinction has no value and should be abandoned (Kuo, 
1921). Kuo, in a paper published in 1922, made two arguments about why the nature-nurture 
distinction has no validity or practical value. First, the concept of instinct could not be proven 
or disproved in laboratory research (Kuo, 1922). Second, focusing on the nature / instinct 
concept has inhibited research in further exploring the developmental and interactive aspects 
between physiology, environment, and behavior. In Kuo’s words, “the preconception of in-
stinct has often betrayed the psychologist into overlooking the new environmental factors 
which are chiefly responsible for the supposedly unlearned acts. Instead of observing and de-
scribing the situations which call forth new acts he attempts the discovery of instincts” (1921, 
p. 653). The nature concept, according to Kuo, “has prevented us from developing a tech-
nique for investigating the antecedents of our reactions” (1921, p. 350). Kuo’s reasons for 
rejecting the nature-nurture distinction were not unique. Similar to Kuo’s position, 
Carmichael (1925) also believed that heredity and maturation were not antithetical to learning 
and environmental influences, and that it was impossible to decompose traits into their ac-
quired and native components.  
Ability vs. Achievement 
 One of the main purposes of intelligence testing is to predict academic achievement 
(Binet & Simon, 1916). In a large-scale study comparing multiple measures of g and public 
examination results from 25 academic subjects (Deary, Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007),  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the correlation between g and achievement was 0.81. This strikingly high correlation was fur-
ther confirmed when Lynn and Meisenberg (2010) looked at differences in IQ across 86 dif-
ferent countries. Results indicated that there is a 0.92 correlation between a country’s mea-
sured IQ and students’ academic achievement in math, science, and reading comprehension 
(Lynn & Meisenberg, 2010). These outcomes are consistent with Spearman (1904), who sug-
gested that a general factor extracted from a battery of measurements based on school grades 
would almost perfectly correlate with general intelligence. Therefore, the central question 
that remains to be answered is whether g and achievement are the same construct? Several 
studies have been conducted to answer this question and the answer is no. The two constructs 
(g and achievement) are highly related, but distinct because (1) the correlation is not perfect, 
and (2) more specific cognitive factors are important to explaining specific aspects of 
achievement (Kaufman, Reynolds, Liu, Kaufman, & McGrew, 2012).  
 Although some researchers have argued that g and achievement may be identical con-
structs (Spearman, 1904) because (1) measures of general academic achievement mostly 
measure g (Frey & Detterman, 2004; Koening, Frey, & Detterman, 2008), and (2) g factors 
extracted from different intelligence tests have been found to correlate almost perfectly with 
each other (Johnson, Bouchard, Krueger, McGue, & Gottesman, 2004; Keith, Kranzler, & 
Flanagan, 2001), evidence investigating the similarities between g and achievement remain 
inconsistent. For example, Deary and colleagues (2007) compared multiple measures of g 
and public examination results from 25 academic subject and found that the correlation was 
0.81, which suggests that while the two constructs are highly correlated, they are not perfect-
ly correlated. One plausible explanation for this phenomenon may be that non-cognitive fac-
tors were captured in measures of academic achievement, but not cognitive measures. For 
example, individual differences such as motivation influence the application of cognitive  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ability to academic learning (Furnham, Chamorro-Premuzic, & McDougall, 2002; Sternberg, 
1999). Furthermore, certain cognitive mechanisms are more associated with academic 
achievement than others (Kaufman, DeYoung, Gray, Brown, & Mackintosh, 2009). For ex-
ample, some basic cognitive abilities, specifically mental speed and short-term memory, have 
an effect on academic achievement because they invoke more complex cognitive abilities, 
such as reasoning and divergent thinking (Luo, Thomson, & Detterman, 2003; Rindermann & 
Neubauer, 2004; Vock, Preckel, & Holling, 2011). Despite the fact that these preliminary evi-
dence suggest that g and academic achievement are different constructs, more empirical stud-
ies investigating the linkage between these two constructs are needed before any conclusion 
can be made. 
Lay Beliefs About Intelligence 
 Lay beliefs, or implicit theories of intelligence, express the common views of how the 
general public thinks about intelligence. Investigations of these commonly-held beliefs have 
been reported for various populations. This section presents existing studies on lay beliefs 
about the nature and malleability of intelligence in the general public. 
Lay Beliefs about the Nature of Intelligence 
 One of the earliest proponents of conducting research on adults’ lay theories of intel-
ligence was Neisser (1979), who proposed that an intelligent person is identified by the de-
gree to which the individual corresponds to his or her culture’s prototype of an intelligence 
person. In an informal study, Neisser collected data from Cornell undergraduates regarding 
what their conceptions of intelligence are. Other formal studies have been conducted asking 
adults to list attributes of an intelligent person (Cantor, 1978) and how often intelligent peo-
ple display certain personality traits (Bruner, Shapiro, & Tagiuri, 1958). Early investigations  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on adults’ lay theories of intelligence revealed that most adults characterize an intelligent per-
son as clever, deliberate, efficient, and energetic.  
 Sternberg and colleagues (1981) conducted three studies to investigate adults’ lay the-
ories of intelligence. In the first study, people were recruited from various locations (i.e., col-
lege library, railroad station, supermarket) and asked to list adjectives that would describe 
intelligent behavior. Results from the first study yielded a list of 250 behaviors. In the second 
study, the list of behaviors from the first study was presented to people recruited through 
newspaper advertisements. On a 9-point Likert scale, participants rated how much they be-
lieved the presented behaviors to be typical of an intelligent person. The list was later reduced 
to 98 items using preliminary factor analyses. The final analyses extracted three factors: prac-
tical problem-solving, verbal ability, and social competence. The authors believed that the 
first two factors are analogous to Cattell’s (1971) theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence. 
The third factor, however, was largely ignored after a review by Keating (1978) concluded 
that factor analyses produced no identifiable social factor and that “academic” measures were 
better predictors of social competence.  
 In a later study conducted by Angleitner and Ostendorf (1993), instead of having par-
ticipants generate behaviors themselves, the behaviors were generated from a dictionary and 
other printed materials. Participants were asked to rate their own abilities against these be-
haviors, and were also rated by other people who knew them well. Although Angleitner and 
Ostendorf (1993) intended to investigate structural differences between self and outside rat-
ings of abilities, no differences in the factor structure were detected. That aside, the final fac-
tor analysis yielded two factors. The first factor was highly weighted on abilities such as 
knowledge, cleverness, domain-specific competence, and verbal fluency whereas the second 
factor was highly weighted on abilities such as sensibility for arts, languages, and physical  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clumsiness. These two factors were highly correlated with the two factors extracted from 
Sternberg and colleagues’ (1981) study (i.e., practical problem-solving ability and verbal abil-
ity), which provided additional evidence suggesting that adults’ believe that problem-solving 
and verbal abilities are common characteristics used to judge whether an individual is intelli-
gent or not (Angleitner & Ostendorf, 1993). 
Lay Beliefs about the Malleability of Intelligence 
 More recently, studies on lay theories of intelligence have changed focus. Rather than 
focusing in individuals’ assessments of their current intelligence or abilities, the field has seen 
more theories about the malleability of those constructs. One that has received much attention 
is Dweck’s implicit theories of intelligence. According to Dweck and Leggett (1988), people 
endorse one of two different “self-theories” about the plasticity of their intelligence and abili-
ty. Some believe what is called the entity view of intelligence whereas others espouse an in-
cremental view. People with an entity view are relatively more likely to believe that intelli-
gence and abilities are characteristics that a person possesses to varying degrees and that 
these traits are relatively fixed (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). In contrast, people 
who hold an incremental view of intelligence tend to believe that intelligence and abilities are 
malleable and controllable and can be improved through effort (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988). Adopting different views may change how people behave (Dweck, Chiu, & 
Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). For example, children who believe that intelligence 
remains constant throughout life will attempt to show their intelligence through good perfor-
mance, and avoid situations where they might fail (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Elliott, 1983). 
Therefore, children who have an entity view are often afraid to make mistakes, particularly if 
they are observed by others, and attempt to “look smart.” On the other hand, children who 
believe that intelligence can be increased through effort are more inclined to learn and are  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comfortable seeking challenges, even difficult ones, that will help them improve their intelli-
gence (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Elliott, 1983). 
 Because lay beliefs about the malleability of intelligence is strongly associated with 
achievement motivation, the majority of the research focused on how students’ lay beliefs of 
intelligence affect their achievement goals (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999), learning 
strategy preference (Grant & Dweck, 2003), response to failures (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 
1995; Erdley, Cain, Lomis, Dumas-Hines, & Dweck, 1997), and stereotype threat (Aronson, 
Fried, & Good, 2002). As a result, there is little research on the general public’s lay beliefs 
about the malleability of intelligence. One of the very few studies that did such research 
found that both incremental and entity theories are roughly equally popular (Dweck & Mold-
en, 2005). Of the recruited participants, about 40 percent of children and adults tend to en-
dorse the entity theory, about 40 percent of children and adults tend to endorse the incremen-
tal theory, and about 20 percent remain undecided (Dweck & Molden, 2005). 
Teacher Beliefs about Intelligence and Teaching 
 Because individuals who decided to pursue a career in teaching may be predisposed to 
beliefs different than those of the general population, this section will focus on existing stud-
ies on beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the nature and malleability of intelligence, epistemological 
beliefs, beliefs about learning and teaching) that have been associated with teachers’ peda-
gogical and evaluative decisions in the classroom. 
Teachers’ Beliefs about the Nature of Intelligence 
 Since Sternberg and colleagues (1981) first introduced the concept of implicit theories 
(or lay beliefs) of intelligence, some psychological researchers have attempted to discover 
teachers’ lay beliefs of intelligence, largely because these beliefs may affect (1) how teachers 
evaluate and interact with students (Lynott & Woolfolk, 1994; Pajares, 1992; Rosenthal &  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Jacobsen 1968), and (2) how teachers recommend students for gifted programs (Pajares, 
1992; Rosenthal & Jacobsen, 1968). A recent meta-analysis investigated how students’ age, 
gender, race, interests, academic achievement, socio-economic status, and personality traits 
might affect how teachers evaluate students’ intelligence, as manifested in the type of stu-
dents teachers tend to nominate for gifted programs (Siegle, Moore, Mann, & Wilson, 2010). 
Several characteristics of students were revealed as determining factors in teachers’ percep-
tions of students’ intelligence. For example, among preschool teachers, characteristics such as 
curiosity, intrinsic motivation, creativity, independent investigation, memory, and numeration 
skills are used as indicators of higher intelligence (Harrison, 2004). In another study, Copen-
haver and McIntyre (1992) found that elementary teachers tend to select characteristics, such 
as boredom, inattentiveness, laziness, independence, and the presence of an extensive vocab-
ulary as indicative of higher intelligence, whereas secondary teachers tend to perceive inquis-
itiveness as a quality of an exceptionally intelligent student. Other studies have also found 
that teachers’ consider students’ interest in extra-curricular activities (Endepohls-Ulpe & Ruf, 
2005), assertiveness and independence (Alviderez & Weinstein, 1999), and leadership (in the 
sense of acting as a positive role model in class) (Hunsaker, 1994; Persson, 1998) as charac-
teristics of students with above average intelligence. 
Teachers’ Beliefs about the Malleability of Intelligence and Impact on Teaching 
 Much of the research related to lay theories of intelligence has focused on investigat-
ing the lay beliefs of students. There is less research related to teachers’ lay theories about 
intelligence. Teachers’ lay conceptions of intelligence are important, however, because they 
have been found to affect how teachers interact with students, which in turn impacts students’ 
motivation and achievement (Calderhead, 1996; Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995; Pajares, 1992; 
Richardson & Placier, 2001).  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 First, studies have consistently found that teachers’ beliefs about the malleability of 
intelligence have an important influence on their teaching decisions and practices (Calder-
head, 1996; Pajares, 1992; Richardson & Placier, 2001). For example, entity theorists are 
those who believe students’ personal attributes and characteristics, such as intelligence, are 
fixed traits and cannot be changed, while incremental theorists believe that they can be 
changed. Therefore, teachers who endorse an entity view tend to attribute behavior and out-
comes to personal traits, such as one’s predetermined intelligence, while those who adopt an 
incremental view tend to make more situational attributions (Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995). 
Furthermore, the lay beliefs that teachers bring to the classroom may interfere with their ped-
agogy and possibly their future as successful teachers. Deemer (2004) suggests that teachers’ 
beliefs about the effectiveness of certain classroom strategies are related to their perceptions 
about demonstrations of students’ ability. For instance, beliefs about the malleability of intel-
ligence might encourage teachers to consider using different strategies as well as class results 
in combination with standardized testing scores when they become teachers with their own 
classrooms. Depending on their lay theories of intelligence, they may rely too heavily on 
standardized testing or, as an alternative, disregard test scores when determining student abil-
ity and achievement.  
 Second, teachers’ lay beliefs about the malleability of intelligence are already well 
established prior to teacher education (Ashton & Webb, 1986; Brookhart & Freeman, 1992; 
Pajares, 1992). These beliefs appear be based on their experiences as students, developed dur-
ing an “apprenticeship of observation” (Lortie, 1975), and are often implicit and difficult for 
them to articulate (Torff & Sternberg, 2001). One common observation is that preservice 
teachers tend to have an implicit view of intelligence as a stable trait of a student, one that is  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difficult, if not impossible for the teacher to change (Holt-Reynolds, 1992; Knapp & Harper, 
2009; Patrick & Pintrich, 2001; Peterson & Moss, 2006). 
Teachers’ Epistemological Beliefs and Beliefs about Learning and Teaching 
 Recently, there has been a growing interest in understanding the epistemological be-
liefs of preservice and inservice teachers because these beliefs influence their classroom be-
haviors, curriculum implementation, instructional approaches, and evaluative decisions 
(Clark & Peterson, 1986; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kagan, 1992; Marland, 1998; Nespor, 
1987; Prawat, 1992;; Richardson, 1996). To explore how teachers’ beliefs might affect teach-
ers’ classroom practices, preservice and inservice teachers’ beliefs about the nature of knowl-
edge (also known as epistemological beliefs) and the nature of teaching and learning will be 
summarized.  
 Epistemological Beliefs.  
 From a psychological and educational perspective, epistemological beliefs deals with 
how people form conceptions of knowledge and knowing, and how people utilize these con-
ceptions to understand their surroundings. A primary investigator in this area is Schommer 
(1990, 1994), who proposed an epistemological belief system consisting of four dimensions: 
certainty of knowledge (i.e., the degree to which one sees knowledge is fixed and evolving), 
simplicity of knowledge (i.e., the degree to which one sees knowledge as either concrete facts 
or relative concepts), source of knowledge (i.e., the belief that knowledge either forms from 
external authorities or is actively constructed from personal experiences), and justification of 
knowledge (i.e., how knowledge claims are evaluated using evidence to justify what should 
be believed) (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schommer, 1994). In Schommer’s proposed frame-
work, teachers positions on these dimensions, which vary along a continuum with naive be-
liefs on one end and sophisticated beliefs on the other end. For example, a “naive” teacher  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tend to believe that (1) knowledge is simple and unchanging, (2) knowledge provided by au-
thorities is accurate, and (3) learning ability is a stable entity. On the contrary, a “sophisticat-
ed” teacher might be more inclined to believe that (1) knowledge is complex and constantly 
evolving, and (2) knowledge can be acquired and constructed given enough time and effort 
(Howard et al., 2000; Schommer, 1994; Schommer-Atkins, 2002).  
 Beliefs About Learning and Teaching.  
 Beliefs about learning and teaching are beliefs held by teachers about their preferred 
way of learning and teaching. The two major models of beliefs about learning and teaching 
are the transmission and constructivist approaches (Clements & Battista, 1990; Clifford, 
1992; Teo et al., 2008; Wong et al., 2009). These two models are often seen as being on the 
two ends of a continuum. Teachers who prefer the transmission approach are more inclined to 
believe that the teacher plays the primary role in knowledge transmission and prefer “teacher-
centered” activities where knowledge is transmitted from teacher to students. On the other 
hand, teachers who endorse the constructivist approach tend to believe that knowledge should 
be actively constructed by the student from their personal experiences (Prawat, 1992) and 
prefer more student-centered activities, such as self-reflections and peer interaction (Chan & 
Elliott, 2004). Although teachers generally use a mix of both transmission and constructivist 
approaches in their classroom practices (Chan & Elliott, 2004), most studies indicate that stu-
dents from constructivist teachers are more likely to adopt deeper learning strategies (En-
twistle, Skinner, Entwistle, & Orr, 2000; Kember, 1997).  
 Relationship Between Epistemological Beliefs and Beliefs About Learning and 
Teaching.  
 Teachers’ epistemological beliefs are influential factors in the shaping of their beliefs 
about learning and teaching and their instructional practices in classrooms (Chai & Khine,  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2008; Chai, Teo, & Lee, 2009). In general, findings suggest that teachers who have naive 
epistemological beliefs tend to prefer a transmission approach whereas teachers who hold 
sophisticated epistemological beliefs are more likely to use a constructivist approach (Chan 
& Eliott, 2004; Chai & Khine, 2008; Chai, Teo, & Lee, 2009; Lee, Zangh, Song, & Huang, 
2013; Schraw & Olafson, 2002; Yilmaz & Sahin, 2011). 
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CHAPTER III 
OVERVIEW OF STUDY I AND STUDY II 
 Beliefs about intelligence are important because they guide how individuals, includ-
ing teachers and parents, judge, assess, and evaluate themselves and other individuals in the 
real world (Fry, 1984; Sternberg et al., 1981). In the case of teachers, their beliefs about intel-
ligence serve as a basis for everyday informal assessments of students’ intelligence and acad-
emic ability, and perhaps the learning goals they set for students  (Cacioppo, 2002; Calder-
head, 1996; Hale & Fiorello, 2004; Pajares, 1992; Richardson & Placier, 2001; Weiner, 
1985). Therefore, teachers’ beliefs about intelligence are of great importance to educators, 
students, and the general public. The overall goal of the present study is to examine common-
alities and differences in the beliefs about the nature and malleability of intelligence across 
several academic subjects between three different populations: the general adult population, 
preservice teachers, and in-service teachers. The latter two groups are distinguished because 
new teachers’ conceptions of student intelligence may be shaped by experience in the class-
room. Two studies have been conducted to investigate beliefs about intelligence of the gener-
al and teacher populations. 
 The first study provided baseline information on lay people’s belief about intelli-
gence. This was accomplished by asking a sample representative of the general population to 
freely generate potential attributes that they believe to be characteristic of an intelligent per-
son. Then, these responses were coded by human raters based on low-level categorization and 
broad thematic categories that emerged from the collected data. The analysis procedure and 
results will be discussed in more detail below.  
 The second study further investigated people’s belief about intelligence in four ways. 
First, the most frequently mentioned attributes generated from Study I were selected and used  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to compare the beliefs in the importance of each attribute held by preservice teachers, and 
inservice teachers. Second, people’s beliefs in the malleability of intelligence (Dweck, 1999), 
both generally and in specific academic contexts (math and language arts), were compared 
between the general population, preservice teachers, and inservice teachers. Third, teachers’ 
epistemological and self-efficacy beliefs were correlated with their beliefs about the mal-
leability of intelligence in general, and across subjects. Lastly, teachers’ (preservice and in-
service teachers) beliefs about intelligence in the specific subjects of math and language arts 
were correlated with the strategies that teachers proposed when confronted with teaching 
scenarios involving struggling and successful students.  
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CHAPTER IV 
STUDY 1: GENERAL POPULATION’S BELIEFS REGARDING THE ATTRIBUTES OF 
AN INTELLIGENT PERSON 
 Study I was designed to assess lay conceptions of intelligence of the general popula-
tion. First, in order to prompt participants to think broadly about all possible attributes of in-
telligence, we asked them to list at least 20 attributes characterizing an intelligent person. 
Second, in order to distinguish the most important attributes out of the 20, we asked them to 
also indicate the five most important attributes of an intelligent person. The listed attributes 
were analyzed and compiled into a master list for follow-up analysis in Study II.  
Methodology and Research Design 
 Participants.  
 A total of fifty-five participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
worker marketplace, referred to here as MTurk. MTurk is an online platform on which any-
one with an account with Amazon can register. The platform provides a wide variety of peo-
ple for conducting research online. Past research on using MTurk as a source of participant 
showed that (1) MTurk participants are more demographically diverse than are standard in-
ternet samples and are significantly more diverse than typical American college samples 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), (2) participants represent a diverse range of income 
levels (Mason & Watts, 2010), (3) realistic compensation rates do not affect data quality 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), (4) data obtained are at least as reliable as those ob-
tained via traditional methods of recruitment (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), and (5) 
survey completion rate for MTurk participants was significantly higher than those recruited 
from those recruited from internet message barons and not that far behind university subject 
pool participants (Dupuis, Endicott-Popovsky, & Crossler, 2013).  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 Participants received a compensation of $2.50 USD upon successful completion of 
the task on MTurk. The “Human Intelligence Task” (or HIT) on MTurk only required partici-
pants to be over 18 years old and are located in the United States. The fifty-five participants 
recruited for this current study were reasonably diverse. In the resulting sample, 72% of the 
participants were White, with the remaining 28% split approximately evenly among Latino, 
Asian, and Black groups (see Table 1).  A majority were currently in college / university (see 
Table 2), single (see Table 3), and employed for wages (see Table 4). The sample was 34% 
female and 66% male, with Mage = 32.33, SDage = 8.37.   
Table 1. 
Study I participant demographics: Ethnicity 
Table 2. 
Study I participant demographics: Highest education 
Table 3. 
Study I participant demographics: Marital status 
Ethnicity
White Latino Asian Black Native American
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
38 71.7 5 9.4 5 9.4 4 7.5 1 1.9
Education







Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
17 30.9 20 36.4 14 25.5 3 5.5 1 1.8
Marital Status
Single In a  Relationship Married Divorced Missing
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
28 51.9 12 22.2 11 10.4 3 5.6 1 1.8
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Table 4. 
Study I participant demographics: Employment status 
 Materials.  
 Attributes of an Intelligent Person Measure. This instrument consisted of two parts. 
Part I (Question 1) offered participants a blank page with instructions at the top. The instruc-
tion asked participants to “please list at least 20 attributes that you believe are characteristic 
of an intelligent person” (see first page of Appendix C). Part II (Question 2) also offered par-
ticipants a blank page with instructions at the top. Part II instructions asked participants to 
“please list the five most important attributes that characterize an intelligent person” in the 
blank space provided (see second page of Appendix C).  
 Procedure.  
 Participants in this study were workers from MTurk who decided to accept our posted 
“Human Intelligence Task” or HIT, designed to fulfill the purposes of Study I. Once the par  
Employment Status Frequency %
Employed for Wages 32 64
Self-Employed 12 24
Homemaker 1 2
Out-of-Work [looking] 1 2
Out-of-Work [not looking] 1 2
Student 2 3
Unable to Work 1 2
Missing 5 9.1
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ticipants accepted the HIT, they were led to a screen with an informed consent agreement. 
The informed consent statement contained information such as the description, risks and ben-
efits, compensation, data storage, and data usage associated with the study. Participants were 
also informed that scrolling down and continuing on to the survey was used as an indication 
of understanding the informed consent statement and agreeing to participate in the study (see 
Appendix B).  
 After consenting to participate, participants scrolled down to a screen informing them 
that there will be a total of two tasks (Part I and Part II) for this study. After acknowledging 
that they agree to participate in the two tasks, participants scrolled down to another screen 
where they completed the first task. In the first task, participants were asked to “please list at 
least 20 attributes that you believe are characteristic of an intelligent person” in the blank 
space provided (see first page of Appendix C). After completing the first task, participants 
continued to scroll down to go to the second task. In the second task, participants were asked 
to “please list the five most important attributes that characterize an intelligent person” in 
the spaces provided (see second page of Appendix C). After completing the second task, par-
ticipants were asked to scroll down to go to another page where they were asked to answer a 
standard demographic survey covering their age, gender, ethnicity, education background, 
marital status, employment status, current job position, and approximate annual income (see 
Appendix D).  
 After finishing the demographic survey, participants were given a code to enter in or-
der for them to receive compensation via Amazon. Participants who completed the two tasks 
received a compensation of $2.50 USD after their participation was verified. 
Data Analysis & Results  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Research Question 0: What do people selected from the general population believe are the 
attributes characterizing an intelligent person? 
To compare beliefs about the nature of intelligence between the general and teacher 
populations, a set of attributes from the general population were collected as a baseline. To 
compile the most current list of attributes characterizing an intelligent person, responses were 
recorded in the form of Part I and II. 
 Part I (Question 1) Response Analysis.  
 Part I (Question 1) and Part II responses were analyzed separately. Question 1 asked 
55 participants to “list at least 20 attributes that you believe are characteristic of an intelli-
gent person” and yielded a total of 1119 responses, which averaged out to approximately 
20.35 responses per participant.  
 An initial attempt was made to categorize and code responses from Question 1 by 
theme. For example, responses such as “open,” “open-minded,” and “open to experience” 
would be categorized together under one theme. However, after approximately one-third of 
the responses were categorized, the process was put on hold due to two reasons. First, many 
of the attributes listed in Question 1 were repeated in Question 2, thus analysis of both ques-
tions seemed partly redundant. One explanation could be that participants chose the five most 
important attributes (i.e., Question 2) from the list of 20 attributes previously listed in Ques-
tion 1. Second, responses from Question 1 included many descriptive adjectives or associa-
tions that did not seem definitional of intelligence. This phenomenon may be due to the fact 
that asking participants to list 20 attributes was simply too onerous or inappropriate in the 
sense of demanding more information than is readily available. For example, many partici-
pants listed non-definitional terms such as “cute,” “kinda,” and “idiom” when asked to list 20 
attributes that characterize an intelligent person. While such terms may reveal stereotypes  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about intelligent people or traits that the respondent believes are correlated with intelligence, 
they do not seem definitional.  
 Part II (Question 2) Response Analysis. 
 Question 2 asked the same 55 participants to “list the five most important attributes 
that characterize an intelligent person.” A total of 275 responses were reported (see Ap-
pendix E). The responses ranged from a single-word adjective to a string of words describing 
an attribute or action. For example, some participants listed single-word adjectives such as 
“inventive,” “curious,” and “articulate” whereas others gave descriptions such as “the ability 
to think for themselves,” “learns from mistakes,” and “ability to adapt to changing 
situations.” All responses were recorded and compiled across participants, regardless of word 
count or redundancies. For instance, if participants listed “curious,” “curiosity,” and “ability 
to conceptualize abstract concepts,” these responses would be treated as three distinct re-
sponses or tokens. 
 Then, coding categories were developed using content-related themes that emerged 
from the data. Because content-related themes can be subjective, two human coders coded the 
list of attributes independently using two methods to (1) maintain reliability, and (2) examine 
whether different categories would arise using different coding methods. The first method is a 
traditional content analysis approach where the coders examined the responses and make a 
list of the main themes that stood out to them. Then, after the themed categories were clearly 
defined and mutually-exclusive, the lists from the two coders were compared, discussed, and 
equivalent or closely related categories were combined. Unusual items, including descriptive 
terms and associations, such as “reader” and “morals” were categorized under “miscella-
neous.” 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 Following this categorization of responses, frequencies of both tokens and category 
types were compiled. To do so, attributes were entered into a column alphabetically and exact 
redundancies were recorded and collapsed into a single type. The number of tokens of each 
type were recorded in a second column as “frequency.” Attributes with more than two exact 
repeats were considered to be a “type.” Other descriptions of attributes were also categorized 
based on existing “types.” For example, attributes such as “ability to learn and understand” 
was categorized under “learning,” while “good critical-thinking skills” was categorized under 
“analytical / rational / logical.” 
 This initial bottom-up classification method resulted in 167 distinct attributes (see 
Appendix F). In order to reduce these responses to a more manageable set of broader cate-
gories, the attributes were re-sorted and edited. Using the attributes with the most frequencies 
derived using the second method, categories were collapsed under the most frequently men-
tioned attributes if they were similar. For instance, if “self-awareness” was frequently men-
tioned, similar attributes such as “self-acceptance,” “self-knowledge,” and “self-realization” 
were placed under “self-awareness.” However, attributes that distinctly differ from any of the 
existing frequent attributes were coded into one or more separate categories (see Appendix 
G).   
 The final selection of attributes was based on the frequency with which a specific at-
tribute was mentioned and thematic categories that emerged from the data. The same analysis 
procedures were conducted by two human raters. Discrepancies between the raters were dis-
cussed and a consensus was required to retain attributes for further analysis. Attributes re-
tained for the present study consisted of 15 attribute categories that participants believed to 
be characteristic of an intelligent person (see Table 5). 
Table 5.  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Final list of 15 attribute categories retained from Study I 
Discussion 
 The purpose for Study I was (1) to provide baseline information on the general popu-
lation’s belief about intelligence, and (2) to create an importance rating scale of attributes be-
lieved to be characteristic of an intelligent person in Study II. 
 Results from Study I indicated that most of the frequently mentioned attributes un-
covered in the study are consistent with previous studies of lay adults’ conceptions of intelli-
gence, in that components of problem-solving and everyday competence were present (e.g., 
Cornelius et al., 1989; Sternberg et al., 1981). There is also overlap between the attributes and 
“formal theory” dimensions of intelligence, i.e., dimensions that intelligence theorists posit to 
underlie adult intelligence. These components of formal theories include Cattell (1971) and  
Taxonomy Attribute Category
Cognitive — General

















Curious / Loves to learn
Motivated / Perseverance
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Horn’s (1965) fluid and crystallized intelligence, Baltes et al.’s (1984) mechanics vs. prag-
matics of intelligence, Sternberg’s (1985) componential vs. knowledge acquisition sub-theo-
ry, and everyday problem-solving abilities (e.g., Baltes et al., 1984; Cornelius & Caspi, 1987; 
Sternberg & Wagner, 1986). However, it is important to note that certain attributes discovered 
in the present study were not well-represented in current theories of adult intelligence. For 
example, attributes such as “being open to experience,” “ability to adapt to changing situa-
tions,” “intellectual curiosity,” and “motivated/perseverance” are not captured by current the-
ories of intelligence. However, some of these attributes are represented in theories of motiva-
tion and have been found to be predictive of academic achievement and future success (e.g., 
Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007; Deci & Ryan, 1985).  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CHAPTER V 
STUDY II: TEACHERS’ VERSUS GENERAL POPULATION’S BELIEFS ABOUT THE 
NATURE AND MALLEABILITY OF INTELLIGENCE 
 Study II was designed to compare beliefs about the nature and malleability of intelli-
gence in three different populations (the general population, preservice teachers, and in-ser-
vice teachers) and investigate whether teachers’ beliefs vary based on academic subjects. To 
compare beliefs between the different populations, samples of the general population (as rep-
resented by workers on MTurk), preservice teachers, and in-service teachers were asked to 
(1) rate the importance of attributes generated from Study I, and (2) complete a combined 
survey that measures (a) their beliefs about the malleability of general and domain-specific 
intelligences, (b) their epistemological and self-efficacy beliefs in math and language arts, 
and (c) their beliefs about the nature of intelligence. In addition, teacher participants (preser-
vice and in-service teachers) were asked to complete an open-ended measure that investigates 
strategies that teachers propose when confronted with teaching scenarios involving struggling 
and successful students. 
Methodology and Research Design  
 Participants.  
 A total of 104 participants were involved in Study II, including (1) sixty participants 
(35% female, 65% male, Mage = 37.37, SDage = 10.613) recruited through MTurk, (2) twenty-
one preservice teachers (76.2% female, 23.8% male, Mage = 25.90, SDage = 5.647) contacted 
through the Department of Curriculum & Teaching at Teachers College, Columbia Universi-
ty, and (3) twenty-three inservice teachers (87% female, 13% male, Mage = 31.39, SDage = 
7.108) contacted via professional development workshops held at Teachers College, Co-
lumbia University (see Table 6).  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Table 6. 
Study II participant demographics: Age 
 General Population Sample. Participants recruited through MTurk were 80% White, 
8.3% Asian, 6.7% Latino, 1.7% Black, 1.7% Native American, and 1.7% Middle Eastern (see 
Table 7). Approximately 38.3% of the MTurk participants were currently enrolled in college / 
university, 35% already completed college, 13.3% completed high school, 10% completed a 
graduate program, and 3.3% were enrolled in a graduate program (see Table 8). Of the sixty 
MTurk participants recruited, about 45% were single, 33.3% married, 11.7% divorced, 8.3% 
in a committed relationship, and 1.7% reported being separated (see Table 9). In terms of the 
employment status for this MTurk sample, 71.1% of the participants were employed for 
wages, 15% self-employed, 5% unable to work, 3.3% out-of-work [looking], 3.3% retired, 
and 1.7% reported being a homemaker (see Table 10). In addition, 96.7% of the MTurk par-
ticipants reported English as their native language (see Table 11).  
 Preservice Teacher Sample. The preservice teacher participants were diverse, but 
primarily White (61.9% White, 28.6% Asian, 4.8% Black, and 4.8% Latino). Approximately 
28.6% of the preservice teacher participants completed college, 57.1% were enrolled in a 
graduate program, and 14.3% have already completed a graduate program (see Table 8). Of 
the twenty-one preservice teacher participants recruited, about 66.7% were single, with only 
19% married and 14.3% reported being in a committed relationship (see Table 9). In terms of 
the employment status of this specific sample, about 71.4% of the preservice teacher partici  
Age
MTurk Preservice Inservice
M SD M SD M SD
37.37 10.613 25.90 5.647 31.39 7.108
Total N 60 21 23
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pants reported being students, 23.8% employed for wages, and 4.8% self-employed (see Ta-
ble 10). Approximately 81% of the preservice teacher participants reported English as their 
native language and most of them reported planning to teach one or all subjects (see Table 
11). The preservice teacher participants’ amount of teaching experience was diverse, ranging 
from 0 to 8 years (Mpre_teaching_exp = 1.86, SDpre_teaching_exp = 2.31). However, note that this 
teaching experience may have been obtained in non-school settings, such as tutoring services. 
 Inservice Teacher Sample. The inservice teacher participants were also diverse, but 
were primarily White (69.6% White, 8.7% Asian, 8.7% Black, 8.7% Latino, and 4.3% Native 
American). Approximately 52.2% of the inservice teacher participants have already complet-
ed a graduate program, 21.7% completed college, and 26.1% enrolled in a graduate program 
(see Table 8). Of the twenty-three inservice teacher participants recruited, about 39.1% were 
married, 39.1% single, and 21.7% reported being in a committed relationship (see Table 9). 
In terms of employment status of this specific sample, about 69.6 were employed for wages, 
with only 30.4% reported being students (see Table 10). About 95.7% of inservice teacher 
participants reported English as their native language and approximately 56.5% of them re-
ported teaching all subjects (see Table 11). The inservice teacher participants’ teaching expe-
riences were diverse, ranging from 1 to 20 years (Min_teaching_exp = 8.022, SDin_teaching_exp = 
6.09). 
 MTurk participants received a compensation of $3.00 USD whereas all teacher partic-
ipants received a compensation of $10 USD upon satisfactory completion of Study II. 
Table 7. 
Study II participant demographics: Ethnicity 
Ethnicity
MTurk Preservice Inservice
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
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Table 8. 
Study II participant demographics: Highest education 
Table 9. 
Study II participant demographics: Marital status 
White 48 80 13 61.9 16 69.6
Latino 4 6.7 1 4.8 2 8.7
Asian 5 8.3 6 28.6 2 8.7
Black 1 1.7 1 4.8 2 8.7
Native 
American 1 1.7 0 0 1 4.3
Middle 
Eastern 1 1.7 0 0 0 0
Education
MTurk Preservice Inservice
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
High School 8 13.3 0 0 0 0
College/
University 23 38.3 0 0 0 0
Completed 
College 21 35 6 28.6 5 21.7
Graduate School 2 3.3 12 57.1 6 26.1
Completed 
Graduate 6 10 3 14.3 12 52.2
Marital Status
MTurk Preservice Inservice
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Single 27 45 14 66.7 9 39.1
In a Relationship 5 8.3 3 14.3 5 21.7
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Table 10. 
Study II participant demographics: Employment status 
Table 11. 
Study II teacher participant demographics: Number of subjects taught (or plan to teach) 
Married 20 33.3 4 19 9 39.1
Divorced 7 11.7 0 0 0 0
Separated 1 1.7 0 0 0 0
Marital Status
MTurk Preservice Inservice




Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Employed for 
Wages 43 71.7 5 23.8 16 69.6
Self-Employed 9 15 1 4.8 0 0
Homemaker 1 1.7 0 0 0 0
Out-of-Work 
[looking] 2 3.3 0 0 0 0
Out-of-Work  
[not looking] 0 0 0 0 0 0
Student 0 0 15 71.4 7 30.4
Retired 2 5 0 0 0 0
Unable to Work 3 5 0 0 0 0
37- 40
 Materials.  
 Beliefs in Fixed Entity Nature of Intelligence, Self-Efficacy, and Epistemological 
Beliefs Measure. For the purposes of this study, this measure was created by selecting or 
modifying several items from existing instruments to measure participants’ (1) beliefs about 
the fixed entity nature of intelligence, (2) self-efficacy beliefs, (3) epistemological beliefs, 
and (4) beliefs about the structure of intelligence. Items measuring various beliefs were in-
cluded in this survey because these beliefs have been shown to influence how teachers make 
pedagogical and evaluative decisions in the classroom.  
 To evaluation whether participants’ beliefs about the fixed entity nature of intelligence 
vary based on different academic subjects, a total of three items were adopted and expanded 
from The Implicit Theories of Intelligence Survey (Blackwell et al., 2007; Dweck, 2012). 
Sample items from The Implicit Theories of Intelligence Survey included three statements: 
“You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence,” “Your intel-
ligence is something about you that you can’t change very much,” and “You have a certain 
amount of intelligence and you really can’t do much to change it.” 
 Because the original survey only assessed participants’ general beliefs about the fixed 
entity nature of intelligence, new items were created to include specific academic subjects  
Number of Subject
Preservice Teachers Inservice Teachers
Freq. % Freq. %
One 9 42.9 6 26.1
Two 3 14.3 3 13
All Subjects 9 42.9 14 60.9
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(i.e., Math and Language Arts). Domain-specific items were created from the original survey 
adding “in math” or “in language arts” to the original three statements to assess whether 
framing them in a specific academic subject changes participants’ responses. For instance, the 
statement “You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence” 
was modified into “You can learn new things in math, but you can’t really change your basic 
intelligence in math.” Of the nine items, three were taken directly from the original survey, 
three were modified items for math, and three were modified items for language arts.  
 To assess whether there are any relationships between participants’ beliefs about intel-
ligence and their self-efficacy beliefs, a total of six items were created to measure partici-
pants’ sense of self-efficacy beliefs in math, language arts, and general intelligence. Sample 
items that measure domain-specific self-efficacy beliefs included statements such as “I con-
sider myself to be a math person” and “I consider myself to be a good writer.”  
 To investigate whether there are any relationships between participants’ beliefs about 
intelligence and their epistemological beliefs, a total of twelve items were selected from the 
30-item Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire or EBQ (Chan & Elliott, 2002) based on their 
factor scores in four dimensions: innate ability, learning effort, expert knowledge, and cer-
tainty of knowledge. Sample items of the EBQ included statements such as “There isn’t much 
you can do to make yourself smarter as your ability is fixed at birth” (innate ability), “If peo-
ple can’t understand something right away they should keep on trying” (learning effort), 
“Even advice from experts should often be questioned” (expert knowledge), and “Scientific 
knowledge is certain and does not change” (certainty of knowledge).  
 Lastly, to look at whether there are any relationships between participants’ beliefs 
about intelligence and their beliefs about the structure of intelligence, three items were creat-
ed to assess participants’ beliefs in the structure of intelligence (i.e., intelligence as a single  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entity, multiple intelligences, hierarchical intelligence). The items were: “There is a single 
general factor that governs the level of intelligence of an individual,” “There are difference 
forms of intelligence, such as linguistic, musical, spatial, interpersonal intelligences,” and 
“Intelligence is hierarchical with a general intelligence at the top, followed by several specif-
ic skills.”  
 In all, this Beliefs in the Fixed Entity Nature of Intelligence & Self-Efficacy and Epis-
temological Beliefs Measure contained a total of 30 statements (see Appendix J). All partici-
pants were asked to rate the extent to which they agree with each statement on a five-point 
Likert scale, ranging from “1” = strongly disagree to “5” = strongly agree. 
 Attribute Importance Rating Measure. This instrument was created from the most 
frequently mentioned 15 attributes acquired from Study I. Participants were asked to indicate 
how important they believe each of the 15 attributes is to characterizing or defining an intel-
ligent person on a five-point Likert scale, where “1” = not important at all and “5” = extreme-
ly important (see Appendix K). 
 Teacher Behavior Measure. In order to examine whether teacher participants’ beliefs 
in the fixed entity nature of intelligence influence their behaviors when dealing with strug-
gling students, several scenarios were developed to tap into teachers’ preferred strategies for 
education interventions for students who showed mismatched abilities with the curriculum 
and/or instruction. This instrument consisted of three scenarios. Each scenario portrayed a 
struggling student in either math, science, or writing.  
 The first scenario portrayed a student, Alex, who excels in reading and writing, but 
experiences difficulties in math: 
 Alex is a strong reader and writer. Alex is well-liked by everyone in the class and  
 works easily with any partner. Alex struggles in math though, and seemed to be fall
 ing further and further behind as the year progressed. During our unit on multiplica  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 tion and division, the rest of the students were quick to recognize skip-counting pat
 terns and became excited as they developed other strategies in multiplication. I  
 thought all this enthusiasm would be helpful and contagious for Alex, but instead  
 Alex pulled back. Alex needed more time to work with manipulatives because the pat
 terns just did not seem clear. It seemed like the pace was too fast for Alex to catch on.  
 The second scenario illustrated a student, Chris, who also excels in reading and writ-
ing, but experiences difficulties in science: 
 Chris is a strong reader and writer and is a model student among her peers. Chris can 
 easily work in pairs or in teams, especially in labs. In science, Chris is quick to pick 
 up complex concepts and has the ability to explain those concepts using everyday  
 examples. For instance, when evaluating students’ knowledge about the structure and 
 properties of matter, Chris was the first the raise a hand with the correct answer  
 already in mind. However, there have been times when Chris does not complete  
 homework and seems bored in class.  
 The third scenario shows a student, Sam, who is enthusiastic in class, but struggles 
still writing assignments: 
 Sam is usually very excited about classes, but struggles with writing essays. For  
 example, students in Sam’s grade are required to write a journal entry at least once a 
 week about what they learned as a way to reflect on their own learning progress. It is 
 obvious that Sam’s classmates are more enthusiastic towards writing their weekly  
 journals compared to Sam. As Sam’s classmates progress, Sam seemed to be falling 
 behind and is even more discouraged in this subject. During a rewriting assignment of 
 a story, the other students were quick to pick up the components that make up a  
 standard essay. Sam, however, was not excited and took longer than usual to complete 
 the task. Even after completing the task, Sam’s work was not comparable to the  
 quality produced by peers.  
 All scenarios were developed in consultation with experienced teachers to include sit-
uations most teachers will encounter at some point in their teaching careers. Participants were 
asked to read the described scenarios, suggest a strategy on how they would talk to the hypo-
thetical student about his or her issues in class, and  provide a rationale for why a particular 
strategy was suggested (see Appendix L).  
 Procedure.  
43
 Study II was conducted using both online and offline data collection methods for 
three different populations: general population, preservice teachers, and inservice teachers. 
Data for the general population sample was collected online through workers from MTurk (N 
= 60). On the other hand, data for preservice and inservice teachers were collected both on-
line and offline. Preservice teacher (N = 5) and inservice teacher (N = 2) participants who 
were willing to participate in the study but could not physically meet with the principal inves-
tigator completed Study II online. However, most of the preservice (N = 21) and inservice (N 
= 23) teacher participants found time, met up with the principal investigator, and completed 
the surveys in person.  
 Research Procedure for General Population Sample. To collect a representative 
sample of the general population, part of the participants for Study II were MTurk workers 
who decided to accept the HIT. Once the participants accept the HIT, they were led to a 
screen with the informed consent statement. The informed consent statement contained in-
formation such as the description, risks and benefits, compensation, data storage, and data 
usage associated with the study. Participants were also informed that scrolling down and con-
tinuing on to the survey was used as an indication of understanding the informed consent 
statement and agreeing to participate in the study (see Appendix H).  
 After consenting to participate, participants scrolled down to a screen informing them 
that there will be a total of two tasks for this study. After acknowledging that they agree to 
participate in the two tasks, participants scrolled down to another screen where they complet-
ed the first portion of the survey, which consisted of the Beliefs in the Fixed Entity Nature of 
Intelligence, Self-Efficacy, and Epistemological Beliefs Measure (see Materials section for 
more information). In the first task, participants were asked were asked to indicate their level 
of agreement with statements that describe various beliefs about their conceptions of intelli  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gence in general and in math and language arts on a five-point Likert scale. Sample state-
ments included items such as “I can learn new things in math, but you can’t really change 
your basic intelligence in math” and “People will learn better if they focus more on the 
process of understanding math than the facts to be acquired” (see Appendix J).  
 After completing the Beliefs in the Fixed Entity Nature of Intelligence, Self-Efficacy, 
and Epistemological Beliefs Measure, participants continued to scroll down where they were 
asked to complete a second task, which consisted of Attribute Importance Ratings Measure 
(see Materials section or Appendix K for more information). In the second task, participants 
were asked to indicated how important they believe each of the following 15 attributes is to 
characterizing or defining an intelligent person on a five-point Likert scale.  
 After completing the two measures, participants were asked to scroll down to go to 
another page where they were asked to answer a standard demographic survey covering their 
age, gender, ethnicity, education background, marital status, employment status, native lan-
guage, and current job position (see Appendix D).  
 After finishing the demographic survey, MTurk participants were given a code to en-
ter in order for them to receive compensation. Because MTurk records the length of time 
spent on each measure, participants’ recorded data will only be considered valid if they spent 
a minimum of five minutes on-task. MTurk participants who spent at least five minutes on 
the measures will be eligible for a compensation of $3.00 USD. Participants will be informed 
of this requirement before they begin the task online. 
 Online Research Procedures for Teacher Participants. A link to an online survey, 
hosted by TC Qualtrics, was sent to teacher participants who would like to participate in the 
study, but could not meet the principal investigator in person. Once the participants clicked 
on the link, they were led to a screen with the informed consent for Study II. The informed  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consent statement contained information such as the description, risks and benefits, compen-
sation, data storage, and data usage associated with the study. Teacher participants were in-
formed that by clicking the “next” button and continuing on to the survey was used as an in-
dication of understanding and agreeing to participate in the study (see Appendix H).  
 After consenting to participate, teacher participants were transferred to a screen with 
instructions on how to complete the survey. specifically, participants were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement with statements from the Beliefs in the Fixed Entity Nature of Intelli-
gence, Self-Efficacy, and Epistemological Beliefs Measure (see Materials section and Ap-
pendix J for more information) on a five-point Likert scale.   
 After completing the Beliefs in the Fixed Entity Nature of Intelligence, Self-Efficacy, 
and Epistemological Beliefs Measure and clicking “continue,” participants were redirected to 
another page where they were asked to complete a second task, which consisted of Attribute 
Importance Ratings Measure (see Materials section or Appendix K for more information). 
In the second task, teacher participants were asked to indicated how important they believe 
each of the following 15 attributes is to characterizing or defining an intelligent person on a 
five-point Likert scale.  
 After completing the Attribute Importance Ratings Measure and clicking “continue,” 
participants were redirected to another page where they were asked to complete a third task, 
which consisted of the Teacher Behavior Measure (see Materials section for more informa-
tion). In the third task, teacher participants were provided three scenarios of struggling and 
successful students and were asked to propose strategies to resolve issues described in the 
scenarios.  
 After completing the three measures, teacher participants were asked to click “contin-
ue” to go to another page where they were asked to answer a standard demographic survey  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covering their age, gender, ethnicity, education background, marital status, employment sta-
tus, native language, subjects taught, and years of teaching experience (see Appendix M).
 Teacher participants who successfully completed the online survey were contacted by 
the principal investigator within 48 hours inquiring the most convenient method to provide 
compensation. Each teacher participant received a compensation of $10 USD upon satisfacto-
ry completion of the online survey. Compensation were distributed in-person or via Venmo. 
 Offline Research Procedures for Teacher Participants. For the offline portion, par-
ticipants were preservice and in-service teachers recruited either through MyTC portal or pro-
fessional development workshops held at Teachers College, Columbia University.  
 First, teachers were greeted by the principal investigator with the following introduc-
tion after being led to a quiet classroom:  
 My name is Anny and I am currently a doctoral study at Teachers College, Columbia 
 University. The intent of this introduction is to inform you of my research intent,  
 which is provided on the first page of the packet in from of you, and to request your 
 participation in it. The survey items have already been approved by TC IRB. It would 
 be great if you can opt to participate. The information you provide will be anonymous 
 and used solely for educational and research purposes. Please read the informed  
 consent on the first page of the packet carefully before agreeing to be part of the  
 study. Thank you for your participation. 
 Then, teachers were asked to choose a seat and only flip to the first page of the pack-
et, which contained the informed consent statement for Study II. Second, the principal inves-
tigator asked the teachers to read through the informed consent statement of Study II (see 
Appendix I) on the first page and decide whether they would like to participate in the study. 
Five minutes were allocated to answer additional questions the teachers may have. Only par-
ticipants who have consented to participate in Study II remained in the classroom. After those 
who have not agreed to participate have left, the remaining participants were asked to com  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plete the packet. The packet will contain documents in the following order: informed consent 
statement for Study II (see Appendix I), Beliefs in the Fixed Entity Nature of Intelligence, 
Self-Efficacy, and Epistemological Beliefs Measure (see Appendix J), Attribute Importance 
Ratings Measure (see Appendix K), Teacher Behavior Measure (see Appendix L), and a 
demographic survey (see Appendices M & N). After finishing the demographic survey, 
teacher participants received a compensation of $10 USD for participating in Study II.  
Data Analysis & Results 
Research Question 1A: Do teachers rate the importance of the selected attributes of an intel-
ligent person differently than the general population? 
 To evaluate whether teachers rated the importance of the selected attributes of an in-
telligent person differently than the general population, descriptive statistics were calculated 
on the ratings (see Table 12), followed by a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) 
on ratings for all 15 attributes. The between-subject effect indicated that there are statistically 
significant differences between the three population samples (i.e., general population, preser-
vice teachers, and inservice teachers) at the 0.05 level, Wilks’ Lambda approximate F(30, 176) 
= 2.376, p < .001 (see Table 13 under Appendix O). 
Table 12. 
Means and standard deviations of importance ratings for 15 attributes of intelligence, by popu-
lation sample 
Attributes
Gen. Pop. N = 60 Preservice N = 21 Inservice N = 23
M SD M SD M SD
Rational / Logical / Analytical 4.65 0.577 4.00 1.095 4.04 1.186
Open / Flexible / Learns from 
mistakes 4.53 0.676 4.67 0.796 4.61 0.839
Creative 3.65 1.039 4.14 0.854 3.61 1.234
48 - 49
 To distinguish which comparisons between the three population samples were statisti-
cally different, the overall MANOVA was followed with an analysis using Helmert contrasts. 
The Helmert contrasts compare the mean of response scores for each of the 15 attributes from 
both the preservice and inservice teacher samples to the mean response score for the 15 at-
tributes as rated by the general population. Results showed that there were significant differ-
ences between the mean response scores from the teacher and general population samples on 
six of the 15 attributes. However, given the number of tests performed (15), a Bonferroni cor-
rection was used. Testing at the .05/15 = .0033 level, the general population’s mean responses 
were significantly higher than teachers’ mean responses on the following attributes: rational/  
Good Communication / Social 
skills 3.08 1.293 3.95 1.161 3.30 1.146
Thoughtful 3.60 1.238 4.00 1.378 3.87 1.100
Self-awareness / Metacognition 3.93 0.918 4.14 1.195 4.43 0.788
Knowledgeable 4.37 0.712 3.86 0.910 3.91 1.164
Quick- thinking 3.83 1.011 2.95 1.071 3.39 1.196
Practical 3.40 1.210 3.71 1.189 3.57 1.080
Curious / Loves to learn 4.47 0.791 4.57 0.926 4.13 1.180
Motivated / Perseverance 4.02 1.097 4.19 1.289 4.26 1.137
Well-rounded 3.55 1.064 3.95 1.244 3.57 1.376
Problem-solving skills 4.73 0.446 4.48 1.030 4.48 0.790
Subject-specific skills 3.63 0.802 3.38 0.921 3.13 1.217
Good memory 3.88 0.922 3.19 1.030 3.43 1.080
48 - 49
logical/analytical, t(101) = -3.673, p < .001 and quick-thinking, t(101) = -3.118, p = .002 (see 
Table 14). The teachers rated only good communication/social skills (nominally) significant-
ly higher than the general population, but this failed to reach significance with a Bonferroni 
correction: t(101) = 2.215, p = .029 (see Table 14). These results indicated that the general 
population tends to believe that rational/logical/analytical and quick-thinking are more im-
portant attributes of an intelligent person, whereas teachers tend to believe that good commu-
nication and social skills are more important. 
Table 14. 
Between-subjects special contrasts of attributes for general population versus teacher partic-
ipants and preservice versus inservice teacher participants 
Contrasts




T p t p
Rational / Logical / Analytical -3.673 0.000*** 0.166 0.867
Open / Flexible / Learns from mistakes 0.707 0.478 -0.260 0.795
Creative 1.081 0.282 -1.684 0.095
Good Communication / Social skills 2.215 0.029 -1.737 0.086
Thoughtful 1.362 0.177 -0.347 0.728
Self-awareness / Metacognition 1.772 0.064 1.014 0.313
Knowledgeable -2.786 0.006 0.214 0.832
Quick- thinking -3.118 0.002*** 1.363 0.176
Practical 1.026 0.308 -0.418 0.676
Curious / Loves to learn -0.637 0.526 -1.598 0.114
Motivated / Perseverance 0.917 0.361 0.202 0.839
50 - 52
*** Significance with Bonferroni correction p < .05/15 = .0033 
Research Question 1B: Do teachers have different beliefs about the malleability of intelli-
gence compared to the general population? 
 To assess whether teachers have different beliefs about the malleability of intelligence 
compared to the general population, subscale scores for Fixed_General, Fixed_Math, and 
Fixed_Language were computed by individually taking the mean of participants’ responses  
from survey items measuring the belief in the fixed entity nature of general, mathematical, 
and verbal intelligences (see items 1 through 9 under Appendix J).  
 After subscale scores have been computed, descriptive statistics were conducted (see 
Table 15), followed by a MANOVA on the Fixed_General, Fixed_Math, and Fixed-Language 
subscale scores. The overall MANOVA indicated that there are significant differences in the 
subscale scores between the three population samples, F(6, 200) = 5.047, p < .001 (see Table 
16 and 17 under Appendix O). 
Table 15. 
Subscale means and standard deviations of fixed-mindset score (“Fixed_General”) from 
Dweck’s Theories of Intelligence Survey (Dweck, 1999) and modified domain-specific sub-
scale scores, by group 
Well-rounded 0.897 0.373 -1.090 0.278
Problem-solving skills -1.896 0.061 0.010 0.992
Subject-specific skills -2.043 0.044 -0.893 0.375
Good memory -2.928 0.004 0.824 0.411
Subscales
General Pop. Preservice Inservice
M SD M SD M SD
Fixed_General 2.91 1.273 1.51 0.564 1.87 0.609
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 To further distinguish which comparisons between the three population samples were 
significantly different on Fixed_General, Fixed_Math, and Fixed_Language subscale scores, 
the overall MANOVA was followed up by univariate ANOVAs using Helmert contrasts. The 
Helmert contrasts compare the subscale scores from both the preservice and inservice teacher 
samples to the subscale scores from the general population. Results from the first contrast 
suggested that there are statistically significant differences between the (combined) teacher 
sample and the general population on all three subscale scores: Fixed_General, t(101) = 
-5.879, p < .001, Fixed_Math, t(101) = -3.902, p < .001, and Fixed_Language, t(101) = 
-4.544, p < .001 (see Table 18). In other words, the general population consistently endorses 
a more fixed mindset about general, mathematical, and verbal intelligences, compared to both 
preservice and inservice teachers. The MANOVA test, and the followup univariate analyses 
comparing the general population to teachers, are significant at .05 even with a Bonferonni 
adjustment for the three domains tested (General, Math, and Language Arts). 
Table 18. 
Univariate t tests of special contrasts comparing teacher and general population groups on 
fixed-mindset subscale scores 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
Fixed_Math 2.70 1.199 1.79 0.826 2.01 0.599






t P t p
Fixed_General -5.879 0.000*** 1.149 0.254
Fixed_Math -3.902 0.000*** 0.713 0.477
Fixed_Language -4.544 0.000*** 0.706 0.482
50 - 52
Research Question 2: Do teachers believe that the malleability of intelligence can differ and 
be at least somewhat independent from one subject to another (Math & Language Arts)? 
 To compare teachers’ belief in the malleability of intelligence across three domains 
(general, math, and language arts), descriptive statistics were performed on the subscale 
scores for Fixed_General, Fixed_Math, and Fixed_Language from preservice and inservice 
teacher population samples. After running descriptive statistics, a repeated measure MANO-
VA was conducted on the subscale scores to test whether participants endorse a fixed or mal-
leable view of intelligence differently across the three domains (see Table 20 under Ap-
pendix O). To check certain required assumptions, Mauchly’s sphericity test was conducted 
and results indicate that the assumptions were met, χ2 (2) = 0.327, p = .849, because the null 
was not rejected (see Table 19 under Appendix O). Although the sphericity assumptions 
were met, the small sample size could be the reason why no violation of sphericity was de-
tected. Therefore, the Huynh-Feldt epsilon correction was used. Using the Huynh-Feldt ep-
silon prevents inflation of the Type I Error rate. Using the Huynh-Feldt correction, the within-
subjects effect of Domain (meaning differences among the Fixed_General, Fixed_Math, and 
Fixed_Language subscale scores) was statistically significant at the 0.05 level, F(2, 84) = 
4.762, p = .011 (see Table 20 under Appendix O).  
 The overall repeated measures MANOVA was followed with further analyses using 
Helmert contrasts to assess how teacher participants’ stated general beliefs about the fixed 
entity nature of intelligence vary when statements are framed in terms of specific academic 
subjects. The two Helmet contrasts compare the Fixed_Math and Fixed_Language subscale 
scores to the Fixed_General subscale score across preservice and inservice teacher partici-
pants. Results from the first contrast showed that the Fixed_General subscale score was mar-
ginally higher from the combined mean of the Fixed_Math and Fixed_Language subscale  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scores at the 0.05 level, F(1, 42) = 3.901, p = .055 (see Table 21). This result suggests that 
both preservice and inservice teachers’ beliefs in the malleability of intelligence in the con-
text of specific academic subjects, such as math and language arts, may vary from their be-
liefs when no academic subject is mentioned. 
 The previous analysis indicated that preservice and inservice teachers’ stated general 
beliefs about the malleability of intelligence is significant higher than when questions were 
framed in the context of specific academic subjects. The second Helmert contrast asks 
whether teachers’ beliefs about the fixed entity nature of intelligence differ between math and 
language arts. Results showed that teachers’ beliefs about the fixed entity nature of intelli-
gence in math differs significantly from language arts at the 0.05 level, F(1, 42) = 5.529, p = .
023 (see Table 21). This result suggests that teachers’ beliefs about the malleability of intel-
ligence is domain-specific. Teachers tend to consistently exhibit a more fixed belief in the 
malleability of intelligence in math, as compared to their belief when the same statements 
were framed in the context of language arts.  
Table 21. 
MANOVA within-subjects special contrasts comparing preservice versus inservice teacher 
participants on fixed-mindset scores (“Fixed-General”) from Dweck’s Theories of Intelli-
gence Survey and modified domain-specific subscale scores, by domain 





Subject-specific 0.681 1 0.681 3.901 0.055
Math VS. 
Language Arts 1.447 1 1.447 5.529 0.023*
Domains*Group
General VS. 
Subject-specific 0.239 1 0.239 1.371 0.248
Math VS. 
Language Art 0.002 1 0.002 0.008 0.929
Error (Subjects)
General VS. 
Subject-specific 7.336 42 0.175
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*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
Research Question 3: Are teachers’ epistemological and self-efficacy beliefs related to their 
beliefs about the malleability of intelligence, in general and across subjects? 
 To investigate whether teachers’ epistemological and self-efficacy beliefs relate to 
their beliefs about the malleability of intelligence, correlations were computed among indi-
vidual item scores from instruments measuring beliefs about the fixed entity nature of intelli-
gence (see items 1 through 9 under Appendix J), beliefs in the structure of intelligence (see 
items 28 through 30 under Appendix J), self-efficacy (see items 10 through 15 under Ap-
pendix J), and epistemological beliefs (see items 16 through 27 under Appendix J).  The 
complete correlation matrix is given in Table 34 under Appendix O; a selected sub-matrix 
showing the correlations of the fixed entity / malleability measures with the other items mea-
suring aspect of beliefs about intelligence is shown in Table 22.  
Table 22. 
Correlations of individual item scores from the beliefs about the fixed entity nature of intelli-
gence measure with beliefs in the structure of intelligence, self-efficacy, and epistemological 
beliefs for the teacher subsamples 
Error (Subjects)
Math VS. 


















se_1 0.016 -0.011 0.002 -0.147 -0.119 -.225* -0.106 -0.098 -0.134
se_2 0.168 0.142 0.114 -0.008 0.048 -0.053 0.012 0.044 0.062
se_3 -0.016 -0.035 -0.018 -0.025 -0.030 -0.038 -0.008 0.007 0.016
se_4 -0.087 -0.034 -0.081 -0.151 -0.151 -.203* -0.114 -0.114 -0.021
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se_5 0.049 -0.049 0.008 -0.049 0.057 -0.036 0.070 0.028 0.033
se_6 .276** .304** .305** .278** .226* .256** 0.191 .207* .329**
ep_1 .596** .640** .653** .470** .494** .534** .533** .492** .526**
ep_2 .706** .711** .685** .594** .513** .568** .568** .626** .636**
ep_3 .349** .359** .357** .390** .338** .396** .352** .449** .431**
ep_4 0.004 -0.029 -0.053 -0.117 -0.064 -0.117 -0.068 0.007 -0.016
ep_5 -0.170 -0.123 -0.177 -.210* -.230* -.268** -.210* -.260** -0.191
ep_6 0.129 0.127 0.087 0.016 -0.026 -0.033 -0.018 0.063 0.039
ep_7 -0.075 -0.002 -0.006 -0.136 -0.189 -.210* -0.112 -0.151 -0.078
ep_8 -0.111 -0.071 -0.056 -.214* -.270** -.311** -.204* -.210* -.197*
ep_9 0.190 0.141 0.155 0.159 0.158 .214* 0.153 0.158 0.127
ep_10 0.155 0.097 0.086 0.132 0.095 .199* 0.144 .195* .207*
ep_11 0.157 0.071 0.085 0.112 0.059 0.111 0.134 0.120 0.133
ep_12 -.381** -.368** -.403** -.346** -.335** -.349** -.323** -.395** -.306**
iq_1 .459** .542** .487** .556** .529** .557** .598** .474** .571**
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*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 Results indicated that all individual items measuring beliefs about the fixed entity na-
ture of intelligence, general and domain-specific, were significantly and positively correlated 
with each other. In addition to correlating with each other, those items also significantly and 
positively correlated with epistemological beliefs items that fall under the “innate ability” 
dimension (see items 16 through 18 under Appendix J). These results were expected because 
items measuring “innate ability” were, in fact, measuring how “fixed” teachers believed gen-
eral intelligence to be.  
 Interestingly, individual items measuring beliefs about the fixed entity nature of intel-
ligence and “innate ability” epistemological beliefs also significantly and positively correlat-
ed with one of the three items measuring teachers’ beliefs about the structure of intelligence. 
Specifically, those items significantly correlated with “iq_1,” which describes general intelli-
gence as a unitary factor, also known as g. In other words, teachers who tend to believe that 
intelligence is not changeable through effort also believe that people’s intelligence is gov-
erned by a single general factor. 
 To better understand the underlying structure of how beliefs about the malleability of 
intelligence, beliefs in the structure of intelligence, self-efficacy, and epistemological beliefs 
relate to each other, a principal component factor analysis was conducted. Three factors were 
retained, according to Cattell’s (1966) scree test (see Figure 1), all with eigenvalues greater  
iq_2 -0.082 -0.101 -0.055 0.094 0.106 0.076 0.169 0.077 0.103
iq_3 0.184 .249* 0.183 0.100 -0.011 0.020 0.059 0.030 0.152
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than 2, and additional factors did not result in large gains in the total variance explained. The 
three retained factors accounted for 30.81%, 9.16%, and 8.60% of the variance in the data.  
Figure 1. 
Scree plot using principal component analysis with rotation on all individual item scores 
from beliefs about the malleability of intelligence, beliefs about the structure of intelligence, 
self-efficacy, and epistemological beliefs for preservice and inservice teachers 
 Table 23 shows component loadings for the 30 items analyzed for the principal com-
ponent analysis and was used to interpret the three factors. The first factor was labeled Fixed 
Mindset, because it was loaded highly on statements that indicate a belief that intelligence is 
a fixed entity and is relatively stable, regardless of whether the statements were framed in the 
context of academic domains: “You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your 
basic intelligence” (0.900), “You can learn new things in math, but you can’t really change 
your basic intelligence in math” (0.875), “You can learn new things in language, but you  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can’t really change your basic verbal intelligence” (0.869), and “Some people are good 
learners, others are just stuck with limited abilities” (0.693). The second factor was labeled 
Self-expertise, because it loaded highly on statements that indicate high self-efficacy and high 
levels of doubt for the validity of expert knowledge: “I consider myself to be a math 
person” (0.654), “I consider myself to be a good writer” (0.334), “Even advice from experts 
should be questioned” (0.566), and “I often wonder how much experts really know” (0.566). 
The third factor was labeled Empiricist, because it loaded highly on statements expressing the 
belief that the more effort one puts in, the more likely it is that one will get to the truth: “How 
much you get from your learning depends mostly on your effort” (0.632), “Scientists will ul-
timately get to the truth if they keep searching for it” (0.729), “If scientists try hard enough, 
they can find the truth to almost anything” (0.783), and “Anyone can figure out difficult con-
cepts if one works hard enough” (0.546).  
Table 23. 
Varimax-rotated factor loadings based on a principal components analysis for all individual 
item scores from beliefs about the fixed entity nature of intelligence, beliefs about the struc-
ture of intelligence, self-efficacy, and epistemological beliefs for preservice and inservice 
teachers 






You can learn new things, but you 
can’t really change your basic 
intelligence.
0.900 0.089 0.022
dwk_gen_2 Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very much. 0.905 0.121 -0.010
dwk_gen_3
You have a certain amount of 
intelligence and you really can’t do 
much to change it.
0.895 0.090 -0.048
dwk_m_1
You can learn new things in math, but 





Your mathematical intelligence is 




You have a certain amount of 
mathematical intelligence and you 
really can’t do much to change it.
0.860 -0.297 -0.025
dwk_la_1
You can learn new things in language, 
but you can’t really change your basic 
verbal intelligence. 
0.869 -0.147 -0.036
dwk_la_2 Your verbal intelligence is something that you can’t change very much. 0.878 -0.129 -0.023
dwk_la_3
You have a certain amount of verbal 
intelligence and you really can’t do 
much to change it.
0.886 -0.064 0.029
se_1 I like math. -0.046 0.668 -0.152
se_2 I consider myself to be a math person. 0.123 0.654 -0.057
se_3 I consider myself to be a good writer. -0.005 0.334 -0.217
se_4 I like to read. -0.105 0.272 -0.172
se_5
Back in high school, I would say that 
I was one of the smartest 20% of the 
class.
0.027 0.362 0.071
se_6 General intelligence is very important in life. 0.372 0.112 0.191
ep_1 Our abilities to learn are fixed at birth. 0.693 0.093 -0.110
ep_2
Some people are born good learners, 
others are just stuck with limited 
abilities.
0.759 0.052 0.056
ep_3 The really smart students don’t have to work hard to do well in school. 0.485 0.029 0.236
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ep_4
People will learn better if they focus 
more on the process of understanding 
rather than the facts to be acquired.
-0.088 0.255 0.275
ep_5 How much you get from your learning depends mostly on your effort. -0.225 0.233 0.632
ep_6 Wisdom is not knowing the answers, but knowing how to find the answers. 0.092 0.422 0.434
ep_7 Even advice from experts should often be questioned. -0.078 0.566 0.052
ep_8 I often wonder how much experts really know. -0.157 0.566 -0.172
ep_9
I still believe in what the experts say 
even though it differs from what I 
know.
0.169 -0.292 0.410
ep_10 Scientists will ultimately get to the truth if they keep searching for it. 0.185 -0.215 0.729
ep_11 If scientists try hard enough, they can find the truth to almost anything. 0.127 -0.152 0.783
ep_12 Anyone can figure out difficult concepts if one works hard enough. -0.393 0.120 0.546
iq_1
There is a single general factor that 




There are different forms of 
intelligence, such as linguistic, 




Intelligence is hierarchical with a 
general intelligence at the top, 
followed by several specific skills. 
0.184 0.464 0.218
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Research Question 4: Do teachers’ proposed strategies for helping struggling students differ 
across different subjects and are any such differences related to their beliefs about intelli-
gence across different subjects? 
 To evaluate whether teachers’ proposed strategies for helping struggling students 
across different subjects (elicited by the struggling-student scenarios) are related to their be-
liefs about intelligence, self-efficacy, and epistemological beliefs, a coding system was de-
veloped for open-ended item responses provided by the teacher participants in order to sys-
temize the responses by creating categories of intervention strategies. A coding manual was 
created by having two raters individually extract different strategy types that arise from 
teacher participants’ responses. Teachers’ responses for the same scenario were diverse. For 
example, some teachers’ mentioned using specific scaffolding techniques, such as modeling, 
whereas others suggested using peer work or one-on-one instruction for the same struggling 
student.  
 After the two raters individually came up with a taxonomy of strategy types, the strat-
egy types from both raters were combined into a master list, where similar strategy types 
were combined so there were no redundancies. Discrepancies in proposed strategy types be-
tween the two raters were resolved through multiple discussions. The final coding manual 
included twelve distinct strategy types, that were further grouped conceptually into either tra-
ditional interventions, work modes, individualized interventions, or social / motivation inter-
ventions (see Table 24).  
Table 24. 
Coding manual for domain-specific scenarios from the Teacher Behavior Measure 





Code “A1” is applied when the 
response suggests passive strategies 
that do not involve any intervention. 
Direct instruction 
(content / skills / 
strategies)
A2
Code “A2” is applied when the 
response suggests some form of lecture 
or direct instruction with regard to 
content, skills, or strategies.
Direct instruction 
(effort / persistence) A3
Code “A3” is applied when the 
response suggests some form of lecture 
or direct instruction with regard to 
effort, persistence, and motivation.
Use specific scaffolding 
strategies A4
Code “A4” is applied when the 
response suggests some form of 
specific scaffolding strategy, such as 
visual aid, manipulatives, and 
modeling. This is a form of active 
intervention, but much more specific. 
Work Modes
Use peer work / group 
work B5
Code “B5” is applied when the 
response suggests some form of peer 
work or group work. 
Work one-on-one B6
Code “B6” is applied when the 
response suggests some form of one-
on-one independent work. This codes 
should also be used even if the phrase 
“individually” or “one-on-one” is not 
specifically used in the response. If the 
proposed intervention implies “one-on-




Code “C7” is applied when the 
response suggests gathering more 
information from the student in order to 
determine the best course of action. 




Code “C8” is applied when the 
response suggests modifying materials 
to fit the students’ level or some sort of 
individualized instruction for the 
specific needs of the student.




Code “C9” is applied when the 
response suggests using students’ 
strengths to compensate for his or her 
weakness in another area.
Improve self-concept / 
confidence D10
Code “D10” is applied when the 
response suggests increasing or 
improving students’ self-concept and/or 
confidence.
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 After the coding manual was finalized, the two raters individually coded the scenario 
responses for all teacher participants (N = 44). Because there were three scenarios (i.e., math, 
science, and writing) for each teacher participant, a total of 132 scenarios were coded. Each 
scenario included three prompts (i.e., “What strategy would you use?,” “Why would you use 
the above-mentioned strategy?,” and “What would you say to [student name]?”). However, 
responses to the three prompts were analyzed and coded as one “intervention plan.” The 
raters assigned appropriate codes to a total of 132 scenarios based on teachers’ responses for 
all three questions. However, there were many discrepancies when the two raters came to-
gether to compare codes for each scenario. Specifically, codes A1 (i.e., laissez-fair), A2 (i.e., 
direct instruction in content), B6 (i.e., one-on-one), D10 (i.e., increase self-confidence), and 
D12 (i.e., increase student agency) exhibited the most discrepancies (see Table 28). Discrep-
ancies in the codes were resolved through discussion between the two raters. Consensus for 
all 132 coded scenarios was reached before further analyses were conducted. Excerpted ex-
amples of the finalized coded scenarios for math, science, and writing can be found in Tables 
25, 26, and 27 in Appendix O, respectively.   
Table 28. 








Code “D11” is applied when the 
response suggests students taking a 




Code “D12” is applied when the 
response suggests giving students 
choices on how they want to learn.
Code Percent  Agreement Cohen’s Kappa N Agreements N Disagreements
A1 93.9 0.397 124 8
A2 87.9 0.431 116 16
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 After the scenario codes were finalized, twelve columns were created for each of the 
twelve codes so that the scenario codes could be dummy-coded into either “0” = strategy not 
used or “1” = strategy used. For example, if a scenario was coded A1, A2, and A3, then the 
columns for A1, A2, and A3 would be assigned “1” whereas columns for the other nine codes 
would be assigned “0.” After all 132 scenarios were dummy-coded, the twelve dummy-coded 
strategy types were correlated with subscale scores for teachers’ beliefs about intelligence, 
self-efficacy, and epistemological beliefs by domain (i.e., math, science, and writing) to in-
vestigate whether there were any relationships between teachers’ proposed strategies for 
struggling students and their various beliefs.  
 Results showed a few scattered significant correlations, but the number of significant 
correlations was low enough to be attributed to chance. For example, approximately 108 cor-
relation coefficients were computed to explore the relationships between the three component 
scores (i.e., fixed mindset, self-expertise, and empiricist) with 36 scenario strategy variables 
for math, science, and writing. Given that the alpha level was set at .05, out of the 108 corre  
A3 90.2 0.550 119 13
A4 85.6 0.568 113 19
B5 93.9 0.700 124 8
B6 81.8 0.404 108 24
C7 91.7 0.804 121 11
C8 80.3 0.540 106 26
C9 97.0 0.784 128 4
D10 84.1 0.262 111 21
D11 95.5 0.703 126 6
D12 91.7 0.117 121 11
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lation coefficients, approximately five of the 108 correlation coefficients can be expected to 
be significant due to chance.  
 In the correlation matrix computed between teachers’ beliefs and their proposed strat-
egy types in math, science, and writing scenarios resulted in a total of 3, 1, and 2 significant 
correlations, respectively (see Tables 29, 30, and 31). In other words, there were few statisti-
cally significant correlations between teachers’ proposed strategies and their various beliefs, 
about the same number expected by chance.  
Table 29.  
Correlation matrix between coded strategies for math scenario and component scores of 
teachers’ beliefs about intelligence, self-efficacy, and epistemological beliefs 
** p < .01, * p < .05 
Table 30.  
Correlation matrix between coded strategies for science scenario and component scores of 
teachers’ beliefs about intelligence, self-efficacy, and epistemological beliefs 





scen_m_A1 0.136 -0.105 -.405**
scen_m_A2 -0.036 0.057 -0.034
scen_m_A3 -0.051 0.066 .319*
scen_m_A4 0.051 -0.074 -0.043
scen_m_B5 0.049 -0.123 0.107
scen_m_B6 -0.056 0.226 0.081
scen_m_C7 -0.050 -0.154 -0.046
scen_m_C8 -0.077 .353* -0.063
scen_m_C9 -0.153 -0.118 0.120
scen_m_D10 0.011 -0.028 -0.274
scen_m_D11 -0.174 0.106 .385**
scen_m_D12 -0.150 0.008 0.047






* p < .05 
b Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
Table 31.  
Correlation matrix between coded strategies for writing scenario and component scores of 
teachers’ beliefs about intelligence, self-efficacy, and epistemological beliefs 
* p < .05  
scen_s_A1 .b .b .b
scen_s_A2 .b .b .b
scen_s_A3 0.257 -0.253 0.090
scen_s_A4 .b .b .b
scen_s_B5 -0.016 -0.079 0.251
scen_s_B6 -0.208 -0.153 -0.030
scen_s_C7 -0.226 0.083 -0.049
scen_s_C8 0.061 -0.066 0.017
scen_s_C9 .b .b .b
scen_s_D10 -0.059 0.033 -0.121
scen_s_D11 0.159 0.037 -0.085
scen_s_D12 -.318* -0.046 -0.128





scen_w_A1 0.189 -0.068 -.344*
scen_w_A2 0.021 -0.017 0.102
scen_w_A3 0.190 -0.212 -0.044
scen_w_A4 -0.104 0.145 -0.174
scen_w_B5 0.083 0.082 -0.038
scen_w_B6 -0.050 0.058 -0.260
scen_w_C7 -0.153 -0.009 0.203
scen_w_C8 -0.059 0.145 0.237
scen_w_C9 .b .b .b
scen_w_D10 .303* 0.294 0.107
scen_w_D11 -0.208 -0.153 -0.030
scen_w_D12 -0.116 -0.063 -0.111
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b Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
Discussion 
 The purpose for Study II was to investigate (1) whether teachers’ beliefs about the na-
ture and malleability of intelligence differ from those of the general population, (2) whether 
teachers’ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence vary for specific academic domains, (3) 
whether teachers’ beliefs about intelligence are related to their self-efficacy and epistemolog-
ical beliefs, and (4) whether teachers’ various beliefs influence the types of strategies pro-
posed when helping struggling students. These questions are important because these types of 
teacher beliefs may influence their teaching methodology (Calderhead, 1996; Fang, 1996; 
Fives & Buehl, 2010; Pajares, 1992; Richardson & Placier, 2001), their students’ beliefs 
about intelligence (Patterson, Kravchenko, Chen-Bouck & Kelley, 2016), and their preferred 
feedback for students, which could either help or inhibit their student’ academic achieve-
ments (Leroy et al., 2007). 
 Results from Study II lead to several conclusions. First, evidence was found suggest-
ing that teachers tend to place less importance on certain attributes of intelligence compared 
to the general population. Specifically, teachers believed that non-cognitive attributes are 
more important to characterize an intelligent person than traditional, cognitive attributes. For 
example, teachers consistently rated attributes such as “good communication / social skills” 
as more important than “rational / logical / analytical” and “quick-thinking.” This finding in-
dicates that teachers tend to have a broader and less traditional conception of intelligence 
compared to the general population, regardless of level of education (see Table 32 under Ap-
pendix O).  
 Second, evidence was found indicating that teachers tend to view intelligence as more 
malleable compared to the general population, regardless of teaching experience or level of  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education. In other words, teachers are more likely to believe that intelligence can be in-
creased through effort and persistence. However, it is important to note that teachers’ level of 
belief in the malleability of intelligence varies based on specific academic domains. For ex-
ample, although teachers consistently indicated a strong, general belief in the malleability of 
intelligence, teachers’ tend to exhibit a more fixed belief when “hard” subjects, such as math, 
were mentioned. This phenomenon indicated that perhaps teachers perceive math differently 
and that these different perceptions about math may affect their beliefs about how malleable 
intelligence can be.  
 Third, correlation and principal components analysis on teachers’ belief about intelli-
gence, their self-efficacy, and epistemological beliefs showed that there is a significant rela-
tionship between items measuring teachers’ belief about the malleability of intelligence and 
those that measure teachers’ epistemological belief in innate ability. Additionally, those items 
also significantly and positively correlate with the item that describes intelligence as a unitary 
g factor. In other words, teachers who tend to believe that intelligence is a relatively fixed 
entity may also be more likely to endorse the belief that all mental performance could be 
conceptualized in terms of a single general ability factor, also known as the g factor. This 
suggests that teacher training emphasizing the malleability of intelligence should be be cou-
pled with instruction in modern theories of the structure of intellect. 
 Lastly, correlation analysis between teachers’ various beliefs and intervention strate-
gies in math, science, and writing found a few significant relationships between those vari-
ables. However, given the number of correlation coefficients computed, the low number of 
significant correlation coefficients may be due to chance. For example, a total of 108 correla-
tion coefficients were computed to explore the relationships between the three component 
scores (i.e., fixed mindset, self-expertise, and empiricist) with 36 scenario strategy variables  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for math, science, and writing. Given that the alpha level was set at .05, out of the 108 corre-
lation coefficients, approximately five of the 108 correlation coefficients can be expected to 
be significant due to chance alone. Therefore, the few statistically significant correlations be-
tween teachers’ proposed strategies and their various beliefs could be attributed to chance. 
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CHAPTER VI  
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 The primary goals of the present study were to examine teachers’ expressed beliefs in 
the nature and malleability of intelligence, how these beliefs may vary in different academic 
domains, and whether those beliefs have any significant relationships with teachers’ self-effi-
cacy beliefs, epistemological beliefs, and proposed interventions for struggling students. 
 The secondary goal of the present study was to update and follow up on Sternberg and 
colleague’s (1981) study of the general population’s lay beliefs about intelligence, in order to 
develop an importance rating measure of attributes that characterize an intelligent person for 
teachers. Because the attribute importance rating measure needed to be developed prior to 
achieving the primary goals, the replication study was conducted as Study I.  
Contributions of Study I 
 The general population’s lay beliefs about intelligence are important because most 
evaluations of intelligence that transpire in the real world are based on lay beliefs, not scien-
tific theories of intelligence (Sternberg et al., 1981). Sternberg and colleagues argue that more 
evaluations are made about other people’s intelligence in everyday social interactions, such as 
casual conversations and interviews, than are made in the evaluation of scores from intelli-
gence tests. Unfortunately, lay beliefs about intelligence have been given little attention in the 
research literature. In fact, one of the most “recent” articles on the general population’s lay 
beliefs of intelligence was published by Sternberg and colleagues in 1981. Study I contributes 
to the literature in general population’s beliefs of intelligence by following up on Sternberg 
and colleagues’ 1981 study, providing an updated version of a list of attributes that people 
believe to be characteristic of an intelligent person.  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 Results from Study I differed to some degree from results reported by Sternberg and 
colleagues (1981). Sternberg et al. (1981) reported that people have different conceptions of 
the meanings of general intelligence, academic intelligence, and everyday intelligence, and 
that these conceptions may differ across populations. Discrepancies between the two studies 
may be due to differences in data collection methodology as well as wording. First, there 
were differences in how participants for the general population sample were recruited. In 
Sternberg et al.’s (1981) study, participants were recruited in-person within close proximity to 
Yale University. Specifically, a total of 186 participants were recruited, including 61 people 
studying in a college library at Yale University, 63 people waiting for trains in the New 
Haven train station during morning and afternoon rush hours, and 62 people entering a local 
supermarket in New Haven. On the other hand, participants from the present study were re-
cruited online through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk worker marketplace (MTurk). The only 
restrictions placed on participants recruited through MTurk were that they were located in the 
United States and that they had to be at least 18 years old to participate. Second, the tasks 
presented to the participants between the two studies were slightly different. In Sternberg and 
colleague’s (1981) study, participants were given a blank page on which to list behaviors 
characteristic of general intelligence, academic intelligence, everyday intelligence, or unintel-
ligence. However, for the present study, participants were given a blank page with two 
prompts. The first prompt asked participants to list at least 20 attributes that characterize an 
intelligent person whereas the second asked participants to list the five most important attrib-
utes that characterize an intelligence person.  
 It is important to note that differences in recruitment of participants and the design of 
prompts were intentional. First, the present study recruited participants from MTurk because 
participants from MTurk are often more representative of the U.S. population than in-person  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convenience samples, and respond to experimental stimuli in a manner consistent with prior 
research (Berinsky, Huber & Lenz, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011). Second, the 
present study focused the prompts to only ask about attributes of intelligence, because the 
goals of Study I were different from that of Sternberg and colleagues’. The goal of Sternberg 
and colleagues’ (1981) study was to compile a master list of intelligent and unintelligent be-
haviors, whereas the goals of the present study were to gain a comprehensive picture of the 
general population’s beliefs in the attributes of an intelligent person and to develop an impor-
tance rating measure using those attributes for teachers in Study II.  
 Results from Study I yielded two findings. First, the general population has well-de-
veloped, but diverse, lay beliefs about intelligence. Specifically, participants from this sample 
of the general population believe that an intelligent person characteristically has at least some 
of the following 15 attributes: (1) rational / analytical / logical, (2) creative, (3) thoughtful, 
(4) knowledgeable, (5) quick thinking, (6) well-rounded, (7) problem-solving skills, (8) sub-
ject-specific skills, (9) good memory, (10) open / flexible / learns from mistakes, (11) self-
awareness, (12) practical, (13) good communication skills, (14) curious / loves to learn, and 
(15) motivated / perseverance. These 15 attributes are diverse, but consistent with previous 
studies of people’s conceptions of intelligence. For example, similar to findings from Stern-
berg and colleagues’ 1981 study, results indicate that attributes such as “practical,” “problem-
solving ability,” and “good communication / social skills” are characteristics of an intelligent 
person. In fact, the final list of attributes from Study I not only captures attributes described 
by Sternberg and colleague (1981), but also align with some existing scientific theories of 
intelligence. For instance, “problem-solving ability” and “good communication skills” are 
similar to Cattell (1971) and Horn’s (1985) theory in fluid and crystallized abilities. In psy-
chometrics, fluid ability is best measured by testing reasoning and problem solving problems  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(i.e., analogies, classifications, etc.). Crystallized ability, on the other hand, is measured by 
testing knowledge that has been acquired over time (i.e., vocabulary, general information, 
etc.). 
 Although the resulting list of attributes from Study I include attributes mentioned in 
previous studies of lay and scientific theories of intelligence, certain attributes discovered in 
the present study are not as well-represented in current theories of adult intelligence, and in 
fact stretch the boundaries of the concept. For instance, motivational attributes such as “cu-
riosity,” “loves to learn,” and “motivated / perseverance” are not represented in existing sci-
entific theories of intelligence, including Gardner’s (1983) Theory of Multiple Intelligences, 
Sternberg’s (1985, 1997) Triarchic Theory of Intelligence, Cattell (1943) and Horn’s (1985) 
Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Abilities, and Carroll’s (1993) Three-Stratum Theory. How-
ever, other of these attributes are well-represented in theories of motivation and have been 
found to be predictive of students’ academic achievement and future success (e.g., Duck-
worth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007; Deci & Ryan, 1985). Thus, it seems that the gen-
eral population has a lay theory of what might be called “expressed intelligence” or 
“achieved intelligence”, that stresses what people actually achieve with their intellectual po-
tential. 
 The findings from Study I are important because updating and expanding our under-
standing of the general population’s lay beliefs about intelligence (1) provides a more current 
and comprehensive picture of people’s lay beliefs, and (2) functions as baseline information 
so that research in lay beliefs of intelligence can be extended to include and compare between 
high-impact populations, such as preservice and inservice teachers.  
Contributions and Implications of Study II  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 Teachers’ beliefs of intelligence are important because these implicit beliefs about in-
telligence would seem to play a critical role in how teachers evaluate students’ intelligence 
and their expectations for their students on a daily basis (Calderhead, 1996; Fang, 1996; Pa-
jares, 1992; Richardson & Placier, 2001). However, given the impact that teachers’ beliefs of 
intelligence could have, there has been surprisingly little research focused on teachers’ ex-
pressed beliefs about intelligence, how teachers’ beliefs about intelligence relate to self-effi-
cacy and epistemological beliefs, and the potential consequences that these beliefs may bring. 
 Importance Rating of Attributes that Characterize an Intelligent Person. The 
present findings show that teachers consistently rated non-cognitive attributes as more impor-
tant characteristics of an intelligent person compared to the general population. For example, 
teachers tend to believe that attributes such as “good communication / social skills” as more 
important than “rational / logical / analytical,” “good memory,” or “problem-solving ability.” 
This is noteworthy because teachers are considered our “expert” group. Even with the level 
of education taken into consideration, teachers tend to believe that non-cognitive attributes 
such as “good communication skills,” “self-awareness,” and “metacognition” as more impor-
tant attributes indicative of an intelligent person, compared to the general population (see Ta-
ble 28 under Appendix O).  
 Surprisingly, there were no significant differences in how preservice and inservice 
teachers rated the 15 attributes. One possible reason that there were no significant differences 
based on teachers’ teaching experience is that there is an overlap of years of teaching experi-
ence between the preservice and inservice teacher samples. Because the demographic survey 
for teacher participants did not specify whether their teaching experience has to be within a 
school setting, many preservice teachers reported several years of teaching experience, which 
might have been attained by working for tutoring services and in other informal settings.  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Specifically, preservice teacher participants reported teaching experience ranging from 0 to 8 
years, whereas inservice teachers reported a range from 1 to 20 years. Follow-up analyses 
were conducted to explore the implications of this overlap. To do this, the preservice versus 
inservice dichotomy was dropped, and two new teacher groups were formed based solely on 
their years of teaching experience. The new novice teacher group only included those with 
less than three years of teaching experience whereas the new experienced teacher group in-
cluded those with more than three years of teaching experience. While there were no differ-
ences between the original preservice and inservice teacher groups in how they rated the im-
portance of the 15 attributes, results using these redefined teacher groups revealed one signif-
icant difference (using a Bonferroni correction) between the new novice and experienced 
teacher groups. Specifically, novice teachers tend to believe that “creativity” is a more impor-
tant attribute that is indicative of intelligence, compared to the more experienced teacher 
group (see Table 33 under Appendix O). This follow-up analysis using redefined teacher 
groups based on years of teaching experience may provide a cleaner test of the effect that 
teaching experience has on teachers’ beliefs in the types of attributes that characterize an in-
telligent person.  
 Although these findings show that teachers may hold broader, more modern concep-
tions of intelligence compared to the general population, there are a few possible negative 
implications of this phenomenon. Specifically, teachers may inappropriately assess their stu-
dents’ intellectual ability and potential success in school based on a few teacher-preferred at-
tributes (Hersh & Walker, 1983; Walker, Irvin, Noell & Singer, 1992), or on attributes that are 
easy to observe in the classroom. For example, if teachers believe “good communication / 
social skills” are important attributes or indicators for success in the classroom, students who  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do not exhibit “good communication / social skills” may influence the teachers’ level of ex-
pectation and teaching methodology. 
 Teachers’ Beliefs in Intelligence across Different Academic Domains.  These find-
ings suggest that teachers expressed somewhat different beliefs in the malleability of intelli-
gence when the survey items were framed in the context of math and language arts. Specifi-
cally, teacher participants exhibit a more fixed view of the nature of intelligence when the 
survey items are framed in terms of math, rather than language arts or domain-general items. 
This finding aligns with the results of a recent study by Patterson, Kravchenko, Chen-Bouck, 
and Kelley (2016) on teachers’ views of ability and effort across academic domains. Accord-
ing to Patterson et al. (2016), teachers reported more fixed views of intelligence in the arts 
domain (i.e., music, creative writing, and visual arts) and more malleable views of intelli-
gence in the humanities domain (i.e., language arts, social studies, and foreign language). Al-
though Patterson et al.’s study also looked at STEM domains (i.e., advanced math, basic 
math, and science), results indicated that teachers held a more fixed viewed of intelligence 
for STEM performance compared to performance in the humanities, but not compared to per-
formance in the arts. This result suggests that teachers’ may perceive different academic do-
mains differently and that these different perceptions about math and language arts may affect 
their beliefs about how malleable intelligence can be.  
 To further explore the role of experience in teacher beliefs, as mentioned in the previ-
ous section, follow-up analysis were conducted to investigate whether defining teacher 
groups based on their years of teaching experience may alter the results. Results using the 
redefined novice and experienced teacher groups show that there are no differences in the ba-
sic results compared to using the original preservice and inservice teacher groups. In other 
words, regardless of teachers’ years of teaching experience, teachers continue to perceive dif  
77
ferent academic domains differently and that these different perceptions about math and lan-
guage arts might influence teachers’ beliefs about intelligence.  
 These findings are important because teachers’ beliefs about the nature and malleabil-
ity of intelligence must affect their beliefs about learning and about student potential, this the 
present findings have implications for teacher education programs. Teachers’ varying beliefs 
about the malleability of intelligence in math versus language arts suggest that teacher educa-
tion programs should take into consideration the messages they convey about ability and ef-
fort, particularly within the context of different academic domains. 
 Relationships between Teachers’ Beliefs in Intelligence, Self-efficacy, and Episte-
mological Beliefs. Findings suggest that there are several significant relationships between 
teachers’ beliefs in the fixed entity nature of intelligence, their self-efficacy, and epistemolog-
ical beliefs. First, there is a significant and positive relationship between teachers’ beliefs 
about the fixed entity nature of intelligence and their epistemological beliefs in innate ability. 
This relationship was expected due to the similar nature of the two measures. Items measur-
ing teachers’ beliefs in the fixed entity nature of intelligence address the question of whether 
intelligence can be changed through effort (Dweck, 1999). On the other hand, the items mea-
suring epistemological beliefs in innate ability examine beliefs relating to whether abilities 
are inherent and pre-determined at birth (Chan & Elliot, 2004). Thus the two instruments 
measure two poles of  the same concept. In fact, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) argue that the 
epistemological belief in innate ability subscale is a “concept borrowed from Dweck and 
Leggett” (p. 106).  
 Second, teachers’ beliefs in the fixed entity nature of intelligence and innate ability 
also significantly and positively correlate with one of the three items that measure teachers’ 
beliefs in the structure of intelligence, which describes intelligence as an unitary g factor. In  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other words, this finding shows that teachers who believe that intelligence is fixed at birth 
may also be more likely to believe that intelligence could be conceptualized in terms of a sin-
gle general ability factor, which is a very traditional way of portraying intelligence. This find-
ing may have implications for teacher education programs regarding the degree to which 
these programs place emphasis on traditional and/or contemporary views of intelligence. For 
example, it would be beneficial to teachers for these programs to learn more about contempo-
rary views of intelligence, such as Carroll’s (1993) Three-Stratum Theory of Intelligence.  
 Some may argue that teachers are well aware of contemporary theories of intelli-
gence. One of the most widely-known theories of intelligence among practitioners is Gard-
ner’s (1983) Theory of Multiple Intelligences. Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences is 
attractive because it emphasizes individualized instruction and implies students have different 
preferred learning styles. For teachers in a chaotic classroom, Gardner’s theory and the learn-
ing styles approach can be appealing because it promises teachers a simple solution for solv-
ing educational problems related to students’ academic achievement. However, some prior 
research has suggested that neither Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences nor the learn-
ing styles approach should be accepted. First, most of the results presented to support the 
Theory of Multiple Intelligences are correlational and do not provide enough empirical evi-
dence to suggest that this theory should be widely accepted (Sternberg, 1999). Second, learn-
ing style instruments are not valid or reliable (Coffield et al., 2004; Stahl, 1999), there ap-
pears to be no benefit to matching instruction to preferred learning style (Arter & Jenkins, 
1979; Coffield et al., 2004; Stahl, 1999), and there is no evidence that understanding a stu-
dent’s learning style improves learning and its related outcomes (Coffield et al., 2004). Al-
though Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences and the usefulness of learning styles have 
been challenged for years (Curry, 1990; Doyle & Rutherford, 1990; Stahl, 1999; Sternberg,  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1999), teacher educators and teacher education programs have continued to teach and use 
them in the classroom. 
 While focusing on contemporary views of intelligence in teacher education programs 
may be beneficial, it is important for teacher educators and teacher education programs to 
select and promote contemporary views of intelligence and associated instructional practices 
that have substantial empirical evidence established in the research literature. 
 Relationships between Teachers’ Beliefs and Teachers’ Proposed Strategies in 
Math, Science, and Writing Scenarios. The present results find little evidence of any signifi-
cant relationships between teachers’ beliefs and teachers’ proposed strategies for struggling 
students. This could indicate that there is little to no relationship between teachers’ beliefs 
and teachers’ proposed strategies for struggling students. However, the existence of prior re-
search indicating that teachers’ beliefs do influence their instructional practices suggests oth-
erwise. Thus, possible reasons for the present essentially null results (beyond mere power 
considerations) should be considered.  
 First, a potential reason for the lack of evidence when investigating the relationship 
between teachers’ beliefs and teachers’ proposed strategies may be how the coding system 
was conceptualized. There are two issues in the current coding manual. First, the coding 
manual did not code specifically for strategies based on learning styles. Although learning 
styles have not been found to be effective (Curry, 1990; Doyle & Rutherford, 1990; Stahl, 
1999), revising the coding manual to include learning styles may provide additional evidence 
in the relationship between teachers’ beliefs and their proposed strategies due to the sheer 
number of times learning styles were mentioned by teachers. Second, the coding scheme was 
not designed to distinguish between teachers’ intended goals for struggling students (i.e., in-
crease content knowledge, leadership, confidence, or motivation) and teachers’ proposed  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methods to reach those goals (i.e., direct instruction, select content based on interest, or scaf-
folding). 
 Follow-up research should refine the current coding system to distinguish between (1) 
learning styles, and (2) teachers’ goals versus methods. This distinction may be important in 
exploring whether teachers’ proposed methods align with their goals and help build a more 
comprehensive and accurate picture of whether teachers’ beliefs influence the types of strate-
gies proposed for struggling students. 
Limitations 
 Study I. There are potential limitations to the results presented in Study I. First, there 
are limitations related to the population sample. The general population sample was recruited 
online through MTurk. Although MTurk provides a platform for a wide variety of people of 
participant, and demographic data indicate that the present sample was reasonably diverse 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Dupuis, Endicott-Popovsky, & Crossler, 2013; Ma-
son & Watts, 2010), it is important to acknowledge the fact that MTurk participants may in-
clude professional survey takers (Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). 
Professional survey takers are those who participate in many studies and share information 
with one another about those studies (Chandler, Mueller & Paolacci, 2014). Another potential 
limitation is the fact that MTurk participants are generally younger than the general popula-
tion and may over-represent women and under-represent African Americans (Berinsky, Huber 
& Lenz, 2012; Horton et al., 2011; Ipeirotis et al., Paolacci et al., 2010).   
 Second, the population sample for Study I was recruited by having MTurk partici-
pants opting-in to participate in the study after reading a brief description of the study, 
amount of compensation, and how long the study will take on the provided consent state-
ment. It is important to note that because MTurk participants need to opt-in in order to partic  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ipate, there is a possibility for the results to be susceptible to selection bias. Therefore, the 
generalizability of the finding from Study I to the general U.S. population should be viewed 
with caution.  
 Study II. There are also limitations to the results presented in Study II. First, there are 
limitations related to sample size and the population samples. For example, the demographic 
survey administered to the general population sample recruited from MTurk did not ask par-
ticipants to report their occupation. Therefore, there is a possibility that the general popula-
tion sample for this current study included teachers as well. This is perhaps an unavoidable 
confound, since the general population does in fact include teachers. However, this being the 
case, tests of whether there is a difference between what teachers and the general population 
believe to be characteristic of an intelligent person may have been attenuated. This is essen-
tially a bias in the conservative direction, though, so the significant differences detected in the 
present analyses are not called into question. Second, the preservice teacher participants were 
drawn from samples of students currently pursuing teaching certificates under the Depart-
ment of Curriculum and Teaching at Teachers College, Columbia University. Because preser-
vice teachers were drawn from a single department at a single educational institution, gener-
alizability of findings for preservice teachers outside of this specific educational and geo-
graphic context may be limited. Third, although the inservice teacher participants were more 
diverse than the preservice teacher sample, limitations for the inservice teacher sample still 
exist because they were recruited to participate in the current study directly after they attend-
ed professional workshops held at TC. Thus, it is important to acknowledge the possibility 
that inservice teachers’ responses may be influenced by the professional workshops they were 
recruited from. Therefore, generalizability of findings between the general population, pre-
service teachers, and inservice teachers should be interpreted with these limitations in mind.  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 The second limitation relates to issues of power. Given that most of the analyses con-
ducted in were MANOVAs, the small sample size (N = 60 for general population sample and 
N = 44 for teacher population sample) could result in a lack of power for the results of Study 
II.  
 The third limitation relates to the operational definition of epistemological beliefs 
mentioned throughout this manuscript. The operational definition used in the current study 
was based on the definition proposed by Chan and Elliot (2004). According to Chan and El-
liot, epistemological belief refers to a combination of personal and general epistemological 
beliefs which include how individuals come to know, theories and beliefs they hold about 
knowing and learning. Just as there is no universally-agreed definition of intelligence, there 
are different definitions in the research community for epistemological beliefs. For example, 
epistemological beliefs, as defined by Chan and Elliot, are broader than other contemporary 
notions of epistemological beliefs. While Chan and Elliot’s definition includes the Dweckian 
concepts of innate ability and learning effort, other contemporary researchers in epistemolog-
ical beliefs argue that epistemological beliefs should be focused more narrowly on how 
knowledge is obtained and verified (i.e., the expert knowledge and certainty of knowledge 
dimensions of the EBQ). Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that the operational defin-
ition of epistemological beliefs employed for this current work may differ from other recent 
research on epistemological beliefs.  
 The final limitation relates to the validity of the methods used to measure teachers’ 
beliefs about intelligence, self-efficacy, and epistemological beliefs. These belief measures 
were self-report measures. Although this is a common and valid survey strategy in research, 
self-report measures of beliefs may be susceptible to a variety of validity threats such as de-
mand characteristics. Data from the present study was collected at Teachers College, Co  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lumbia University, a well-known college for the preparation of future teachers, which may 
have influenced how participants responded. For instance, by recruiting inservice teachers 
directly after they participated in professional development seminars at Teachers College may 
have primed the importance of certain concepts, such as the importance of practicing growth 
mindset, and led them to respond in a way that reflect what is currently considered to be pre-
ferred beliefs in education.  
Directions for Future Research 
 The present results concerning teachers’ beliefs in the nature and malleability of intel-
ligence and how those beliefs may be related to teachers’ self-efficacy and epistemological 
beliefs have a variety of implications for future research and teacher education programs. 
One possible line of research is to investigate (1) the types of scientific theories, (2) the im-
portance of lay beliefs in intelligence, and (3) effective instructional strategies taught in vari-
ous teacher preparation curricula. These factors may affect the ways in which teachers per-
ceive intelligence and their proposed strategies to help struggling students.   
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Narrow Abilities Categorised Under Broad Abilities According to the Cattell-Horn-Car-




Informed Consent for Study 1 (online) 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Protocol Title: Beliefs About the Nature of Intelligence [Study 1] 
Principal Investigator: Fu-Fen Anny Fang, MS, Teachers College 734-604-3305 
INTRODUCTION 
You are being invited to participate in this research study called “Beliefs about the Nature of Intelligence [Study 
1].” You may qualify to take part in this research study because you are over 18 years old. Approximately fifty 
people will participate in this study and it will take 15 minutes of your time to complete.   
WHY IS THIS STUDY BEING DONE?   
This study is being done to investigate people’s beliefs about the nature intelligence. 
WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO IF I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?  
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to complete two tasks. The first task will ask you to list attributes 
characterizing an intelligent person. The second task will ask you to indicate the five most important attributes 
of an intelligent person. Lastly, you will be asked to complete a demographic survey covering your age, gender, 
ethnicity, education background, marital status, employment status, current job position, and approximate annu-
al income. 
WHAT POSSIBLE RISKS OR DISCOMFORTS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS 
STUDY?  
Data will be collected online. Therefore, there is minimal risk involved in this study. It is very brief and does not 
involve sensitive topics. It likely involves the same amount of risk as other online activities such as answering 
email or filling out work-related surveys. The principal investigator is taking precautions to keep your informa-
tion confidential and prevent anyone from discovering or guessing your identity, such as using a de-identified 
code instead of your name and keeping all information on a password protected computer and locked in a file 
drawer.  
WHAT POSSIBLE BENEFITS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?  
There is monetary benefit to you for participating in this study. Participants will receive a compensation of 
$2.50 USD upon satisfactory completion of this study. 
WHEN IS THE STUDY OVER? CAN I LEAVE THE STUDY BEFORE IT ENDS?  
The study is over when you have completed the two tasks and the demographic survey. However, you can leave 
the study at any time even if you haven’t finished.  
PROTECTION OF YOUR CONFIDENTIALITY 
No identifying information will be stored with the data collected from participants, thus responses will be confi-
dential. Participants will not be asked to record any identifying information on the survey forms, apart from 
standard background demographic information, such as their age, gender, ethnicity, education background, mari-
tal status, employment status, current job position, and approximate annual income. 
The data will be collected online through Amazon’s MTurk, which is a password-protected program that can 
only be accessed through the principal investigator’s account. This data will be downloaded to a password-pro-
tected computer file and removed from MTurk. Regulations require that research data be kept for at least three 
years. 
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HOW WILL THE RESULTS BE USED?  
The general results of this study will be analyzed, and may be published in journals or presented at academic 
conferences. Your name or any identifying information about you will not be published. This study is being 
conducted as part of the doctoral dissertation of the principal investigator.  
PARTICIPANT’S RIGHTS 
• I have read the informed consent. I understand that I will have ample opportunity to ask questions 
about the purposes, procedures, risks and benefits regarding this research study by contacting the prin-
cipal investigator or IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University.  
• I understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw participation at 
any time without penalty.  
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed becomes avail-
able which may relate to my willingness to continue my participation, the investigator will provide this 
information to me.  
• Any information derived from the research study that personally identifies me will not be voluntarily 
released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically required by law.  
• I should receive a copy of the Informed Consent document.  
WHO CAN ANSWER MY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS STUDY? 
If you have any questions about taking part in this research study, you should contact the principal investigator, 
Ms. Fu-Fen Anny Fang, at 734-604-3305 or at faf2122@tc.columbia.edu. 
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, you should contact the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) at 212-678-4105 or email IRB@tc.edu. Or alternatively, you can write to the IRB at 
Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 West 120th Street, New York, NY 10027. The IRB is the committee 
that oversees human research protection for Teachers College, Columbia University. 
BY CHOOSING TO CONTINUE ON TO THE NEXT PAGE OF THE ONLINE SURVEY, YOU ARE 
CONSENTING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY AND POTENTIAL FUTURE CON-
TACT, SHOULD THIS NEED ARISE. 
EMAIL: ____________________________________________ 
Teachers College, Columbia University 
525 West 120th Street 
New York NY 10027 




Attributes of an Intelligent Person Measure 
Part A. 
In the blank space below, please list at least 20 attributes that you believe are characteristic of 
an intelligent person.  
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Part B. 




Demographic Questionnaire (General) 
Please do not write your name on this form. It will be stored separately from any other infor-
mation that you complete during this study and will not be linked with your responses in 
anyway. The information will allow us to provide an accurate description of the sample popu-
lation. 
1. Gender (circle one) 
  Female Male 
2. Age (please write) 
  I am _______ years old.  
3. Ethnicity (circle all that apply) 
  Hispanic / Latino Native American Asian / Pacific Islander 
  Middle Eastern Black / African American White / Caucasian  
  Other (please write) __________________ 
4. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (circle one) 
  High School   Some College / University   
  College / University  (degree completed) Some Graduate / Professional 
           School 
  Graduate / Professional School (degree completed) 
  
5. What is your marital status? (circle one) 
   
  Single (never married) Committed Relationship Married 
  Divorced  Separated  Widowed 
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6. What is your employment status? (circle one) 
  Employed for wages  Self-employed  A homemaker 
  Out-of-work & looking for work Out-of-work & not looking for work 
  
  Student Military Retired Unable to work 
7. What is your current occupation (if you have one)? (please write) 
   _____________________________________________________ 
8. Is English your first language? (circle one) 
  Yes  No 
 If no, how long have you been speaking, reading, and writing in English? 
  (please write)  ________________ years. 
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ability to adapt to changing situations
ability to comprehend abstract ideas
ability to extrapolate
ability to learn about the small things that make 
up the whole
ability to learn and understand
ability to process and observe information
ability to think for themselves
108 - 114
able to challenge own beliefs
able to discard deeply held beliefs 






always come up with brilliant new ideas
always curious









can debate without emotion
can easily explain hard concepts















doesn't just ask for help but is willing to dive in 
on their own
drive to improve on ones weaknesses
efficiency
endurance


























knowledge of skills and talents














































well-informed about a lot of subjects
well-rounded
wide range of interests
willing to reason
willingness to admit ones own weaknesses
wisdom
works well with others
108 - 114
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Informed Consent for Study 2 (online) 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Protocol Title: Beliefs About the Nature of Intelligence [Study 2 online] 
Principal Investigator: Fu-Fen Anny Fang, MS, Teachers College 734-604-3305 
INTRODUCTION 
You are being invited to participate in this research study called “Beliefs About the Nature of Intelligence [Study 
2 online].” You may qualify to take part in this research study because you are over 18 years old. Approximately 
forty-five people will participate in this study. It will take about 20 minutes of your time to complete.   
WHY IS THIS STUDY BEING DONE?   
This study is being done to investigate people’s beliefs about the nature of intelligence. 
WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO IF I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?  
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to indicate your level of agreement with statements that describe 
various beliefs about intelligence. Lastly, you will be asked to complete a demographic survey covering your 
age, gender, ethnicity, education background, marital status, employment status, current job position, and ap-
proximate annual income. 
WHAT POSSIBLE RISKS OR DISCOMFORTS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS 
STUDY?  
Data will be collected online. Therefore, there is minimal risk involved in this study. It is very brief and does not 
involve sensitive topics. It likely involves the same amount of risk as other online activities such as answering 
email or filling out work-related surveys. The principal investigator is taking precautions to keep your informa-
tion confidential and prevent anyone from discovering or guessing your identity, such as using a de-identified 
code instead of your name and keeping all information on a password protected computer or locked in a file 
drawer.  
WHAT POSSIBLE BENEFITS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?  
There is monetary benefit to you for participating in this study. Participants will receive a compensation of 
$3.00 USD upon satisfactory completion of this study. 
WHEN IS THE STUDY OVER? CAN I LEAVE THE STUDY BEFORE IT ENDS?  
The study is over when you have completed the two tasks and the demographic survey. However, you can leave 
the study at any time even if you haven’t finished.  
PROTECTION OF YOUR CONFIDENTIALITY 
No identifying information will be stored with the data collected from participants, thus responses will be confi-
dential. Participants will not be asked to record any identifying information on the survey forms, apart from 
standard background demographic information, such as their age, gender, ethnicity, education background, mari-
tal status, employment status, current job position, approximate annual income, teaching subjects, and years of 
teaching experience. 
Data will be collected anonymously. Any identifying information will be stored separately from their responses. 
Specifically, participants will be assigned codes to replace names and all personally identifying information will 
be removed from the data. 
HOW WILL THE RESULTS BE USED?  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The general results of this study will be analyzed, and may be published in journals or presented at academic 
conferences. Your name or any identifying information about you will not be published. This study is being 
conducted as part of the doctoral dissertation of the principal investigator.  
PARTICIPANT’S RIGHTS 
• I have read the informed consent. I understand that I will have ample opportunity to ask questions 
about the purposes, procedures, risks and benefits regarding this research study by contacting the prin-
cipal investigator or IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University.  
• I understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw participation at 
any time without penalty.  
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed becomes avail-
able which may relate to my willingness to continue my participation, the investigator will provide this 
information to me.  
• Any information derived from the research study that personally identifies me will not be voluntarily 
released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically required by law.  
• I should receive a copy of the Informed Consent document.  
WHO CAN ANSWER MY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS STUDY? 
If you have any questions about taking part in this research study, you should contact the principal investigator, 
Ms. Fu-Fen Anny Fang, at 734-604-3305 or at faf2122@tc.columbia.edu. 
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, you should contact the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) at 212-678-4105 or email IRB@tc.edu. Or alternatively, you can write to the IRB at 
Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 West 120th Street, New York, NY 10027. The IRB is the committee 
that oversees human research protection for Teachers College, Columbia University. 
BY CHOOSING TO CONTINUE ON TO THE NEXT PAGE OF THE ONLINE SURVEY, YOU ARE 
CONSENTING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY AND POTENTIAL FUTURE CON-
TACT, SHOULD THIS NEED ARISE.  
EMAIL: ____________________________________________ 
Teachers College, Columbia University 
525 West 120th Street 
New York NY 10027 




Informed Consent for Study 2 (paper) 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Protocol Title: Beliefs About the Nature and Malleability of Intelligence [Study 2 in-person] 
Principal Investigator: Fu-Fen Anny Fang, MS, Teachers College 734-604-3305 
INTRODUCTION 
You are being invited to participate in this research study called “Beliefs About the Nature of Intelligence [Study 
2 in-person].” You may qualify to take part in this research study because you are over 18 years old. Approxi-
mately sixty people will participate in this study. It will take about 30 minutes of your time to complete.   
WHY IS THIS STUDY BEING DONE?   
This study is being done to investigate people’s beliefs about the nature of intelligence.     
WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO IF I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?  
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to indicate your level of agreement with statements that describe 
various beliefs about intelligence. Then, you will be asked to complete an open-ended survey that examines 
teacher behaviors. Lastly, you will be asked to complete a demographic survey covering your age, gender, eth-
nicity, education background, marital status, employment status, current job position, approximate annual in-
come, subjects taught, and years of teaching experience. 
WHAT POSSIBLE RISKS OR DISCOMFORTS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS 
STUDY?  
Data will be collected in-person. The survey is about beliefs and does not involve sensitive topics. The principal 
investigator is taking precautions to keep your information confidential and prevent anyone from discovering or 
guessing your identity, such as using a de-identified code instead of your name and keeping all information on a 
password protected computer or locked in a file drawer.  
WHAT POSSIBLE BENEFITS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?  
There is monetary benefit to you for participating in this study. Participants will receive a compensation of $10 
USD upon satisfactory completion of this study. 
WHEN IS THE STUDY OVER? CAN I LEAVE THE STUDY BEFORE IT ENDS?  
The study is over when you have completed the three tasks and the demographic survey. However, you can 
leave the study at any time even if you haven’t finished.  
PROTECTION OF YOUR CONFIDENTIALITY 
No identifying information will be stored with the data collected from participants, thus responses will be confi-
dential. Participants will not be asked to record any identifying information on the survey forms, apart from 
standard background demographic information, such as their age, gender, ethnicity, education background, mari-
tal status, employment status, current job position, approximate annual income, teaching subjects, and years of 
teaching experience. 
Data will be collected anonymously. Any identifying information will be stored separately from their responses. 
Specifically, participants will be assigned codes to replace names and all personally identifying information will 
be removed from the data. 
HOW WILL THE RESULTS BE USED?  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The general results of this study will be analyzed, and may be published in journals or presented at academic 
conferences. Your name or any identifying information about you will not be published. This study is being 
conducted as part of the doctoral dissertation of the principal investigator.  
PARTICIPANT’S RIGHTS 
• I have read the informed consent. I understand that I will have ample opportunity to ask questions 
about the purposes, procedures, risks and benefits regarding this research study by contacting the prin-
cipal investigator or IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University.  
• I understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw participation at 
any time without penalty.  
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed becomes avail-
able which may relate to my willingness to continue my participation, the investigator will provide this 
information to me.  
• Any information derived from the research study that personally identifies me will not be voluntarily 
released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically required by law.  
• I should receive a copy of the Informed Consent document.  
WHO CAN ANSWER MY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS STUDY? 
If you have any questions about taking part in this research study, you should contact the principal investigator, 
Ms. Fu-Fen Anny Fang, at 734-604-3305 or at faf2122@tc.columbia.edu. 
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, you should contact the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) at 212-678-4105 or email IRB@tc.edu. Or alternatively, you can write to the IRB at 
Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 West 120th Street, New York, NY 10027. The IRB is the committee 
that oversees human research protection for Teachers College, Columbia University. 
YOU ARE CONSENTING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY AND POTENTIAL FU-
TURE CONTACT BY SIGNING YOUR NAME BELOW: 




Teachers College, Columbia University 
525 West 120th Street 
New York NY 10027 




Beliefs in the Fixed Entity Nature of Intelligence  
and Self-Efficacy & Epistemological Beliefs Measure  
Directions: 
Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statement below. 




You can learn new things, 
but you can’t really change 
your basic intelligence.
1 2 3 4 5
2
Your intelligence is 
something about you that 
you can’t change very 
much.
1 2 3 4 5
3
You have a certain amount 
of intelligence and you 
really can’t do much to 
change it. 
1 2 3 4 5
4
You can learn new things 
in math, but you can’t 
really change your basic 
intelligence in math.
1 2 3 4 5
5
Your mathematical 
intelligence is something 
that you can’t change very 
much.
1 2 3 4 5
6
You have a certain amount 
of mathematical 
intelligence and you really 
can’t do much to change it. 
1 2 3 4 5
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7
You can learn new skills in 
language, but you can’t 
really change your basic 
verbal intelligence.
1 2 3 4 5
8
Your verbal intelligence is 
something that you can’t 
change very much.
1 2 3 4 5
9
You have a certain amount 
of verbal intelligence and 
you really can’t do much to 
change it. 
1 2 3 4 5
10 I like math. 1 2 3 4 5
11 I consider myself to be a math person. 1 2 3 4 5
12 I consider myself to be a good writer. 1 2 3 4 5
13 I like to read. 1 2 3 4 5
14
Back in high school, I 
would say that I was one of 
the smartest 20% of the 
class.
1 2 3 4 5
15 General intelligence is very important in life. 1 2 3 4 5
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16 Our abilities to learn are fixed at birth. 1 2 3 4 5
17
Some people are born good 
learners, others are just 
stuck with limited abilities.
1 2 3 4 5
18
The really smart students 
don’t have to work hard to 
well in school.
1 2 3 4 5
19
People will learn better if 
they focus more on the 
process of understanding 
rather than the facts to be 
acquired.
1 2 3 4 5
20
How much you get from 
your learning depends 
mostly on your effort.
1 2 3 4 5
21
Wisdom is not knowing the 
answers, but knowing how 
to find the answers.
1 2 3 4 5
22 Even advice from experts should often be questioned. 1 2 3 4 5
23 I often wonder how much experts really know. 1 2 3 4 5
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24
I still believe in what the 
experts say even though it 
differs from what I know
1 2 3 4 5
25
Scientists will ultimately 
get to the truth if they keep 
searching for it.
1 2 3 4 5
26
If scientists try hard 
enough, they can find the 
truth to almost anything.
1 2 3 4 5
27
Anyone can figure out 
difficult concepts if one 
works hard enough. 
1 2 3 4 5
28
There is a single general 
factor that governs the level 
of intelligence of an 
individual.
1 2 3 4 5
29
There are difference forms of 
intelligence, such as 
linguistic, musical, spatial, 
interpersonal intelligences. 
1 2 3 4 5
30
Intelligence is hierarchical 
with a general intelligence at 
the top, followed by several 
specific skills.
1 2 3 4 5
120 - 123
Appendix K 
Attribute Importance Ratings Measure 
Directions: 
Please indicate how important you believe each of the following attributes is to characterizing 








Neutral Not That Important
Very 
Important
1 Rational / Logical / Analytical 1 2 3 4 5
2 Open / Flexible / Learns from mistakes 1 2 3 4 5
3 Creative 1 2 3 4 5
4 Good communication / Social skills 1 2 3 4 5
5 Thoughtful 1 2 3 4 5
6 Self-awareness / Metacognition 1 2 3 4 5
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7 Knowledgeable 1 2 3 4 5
8 Quick thinking 1 2 3 4 5
9 Practical 1 2 3 4 5
10 Curious / Loves to learn 1 2 3 4 5
11 Motivated / Perseverance 1 2 3 4 5
12 Well-rounded 1 2 3 4 5
13 Problem-solving skills 1 2 3 4 5
14 Subject-specific skills 1 2 3 4 5
15 Good Memory 1 2 3 4 5
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Appendix L 
Teacher Behavior Measure 
Math 
Alex is a strong reader and writer. She is well-liked by everyone in the class and works easily 
with any partner. Alex struggles in math though, and seemed to be falling further and further 
behind her classmates as the year progressed. During our unit on multiplication and division, 
the rest of the students were quick to recognize skip-counting patterns and became excited as 
they developed other strategies in multiplication. I thought all this enthusiasm would be help-
ful and contagious for Alex, but instead she pulled back. She needed more time to work with 
manipulatives because the patterns just did not seem clear to her. It seemed like the pace was 
too fast for her to catch on.  
How would you talk to Alex about this issue? What strategy would you use to talk to Alex 
about it? Please write a brief version of what you would say to Alex. 
I would use the following strategy: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Why would I use the above-mentioned strategy? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 








Chris is a strong reader and writer and is a model student among her peers. She can easily 
work in pairs or in teams, especially in labs. In science, Chris is quick to pick up complex 
concepts and has the ability to explain those concepts using everyday examples. For instance, 
when evaluating students’ knowledge about the structure and properties of matter, Chris was 
the first the raise her hand with the correct answer already in mind. However, there have been 
times when she does not complete her homework and seems bored in class.  
How would you talk to Chris about this issue? What strategy would you use to talk to Chris 
about it? Please write a brief version of what you would say to Chris. 
I would use the following strategy: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Why would I use the above-mentioned strategy? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 








Sam is usually very excited about his classes, but struggles with writing essays. For example, 
students in his grade are required to write a journal entry at least once a week about what they 
learned as a way to reflect on their own learning progress. It is obvious that his classmates are 
more enthusiastic towards writing their weekly journals compared to Sam. As his classmates 
progress, Sam seemed to be falling behind and is even more discouraged in this subject. Dur-
ing a rewriting assignment of a story, the other students were quick to pick up the compo-
nents that make up a standard essay. Sam, however, was not excited and took longer than 
usual to complete the task. Even after completing the task, his work was not comparable to 
the quality produced by his peers.  
How would you talk to Sam about this issue? What strategy would you use to talk to Sam 
about it? Please write a brief version of what you would say to Sam. 
I would use the following strategy: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Why would I use the above-mentioned strategy? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 








Demographic Questionnaire (Preservice) 
Please do not write your name on this form. It will be stored separately from any other infor-
mation that you complete during this study and will not be linked with your responses in 
anyway. The information will allow us to provide an accurate description of the sample popu-
lation. 
1. Gender (circle one) 
  Female Male 
2. Age (please write) 
  I am _______ years old.  
3. Ethnicity (circle all that apply) 
  Hispanic / Latino Native American Asian / Pacific Islander 
  Middle Eastern Black / African American White / Caucasian  
  Other (please write) __________________ 
4. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (circle one) 
  High School   Some College / University   
  College / University  (degree completed) Some Graduate / Professional 
           School 
  Graduate / Professional School (degree completed) 
  
5. What is your marital status? (circle one) 
   
  Single (never married) Committed Relationship Married 
  Divorced  Separated  Widowed 
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6. What is your employment status? (circle one) 
  Employed for wages  Self-employed  A homemaker 
  Out-of-work & looking for work Out-of-work & not looking for work 
  
  Student Military Retired Unable to work 
7. Is English your first language? (circle one) 
  Yes  No 
  If no, how long have you been speaking, reading, and writing in English? 
   (please write)  ________________ years. 
8. What subject do you plan to teach? (circle all that apply) 
  Language Arts  Math  Science  
   
  Social Studies  Art  Physical Education 
  Other (please write) __________________ 
9. How many years of teaching experience in an elementary and/or secondary school do you 
have? 
  
  (please write) ________________ years 
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Appendix N 
Demographic Questionnaire (In-Service) 
Please do not write your name on this form. It will be stored separately from any other infor-
mation that you complete during this study and will not be linked with your responses in 
anyway. The information will allow us to provide an accurate description of the sample popu-
lation. 
1. Gender (circle one) 
  Female Male 
2. Age (please write) 
  I am _______ years old.  
3. Ethnicity (circle all that apply) 
  Hispanic / Latino Native American Asian / Pacific Islander 
  Middle Eastern Black / African American White / Caucasian  
  Other (please write) __________________ 
4. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (circle one) 
  High School   Some College / University   
  College / University  (degree completed) Some Graduate / Professional 
           School 
  Graduate / Professional School (degree completed) 
  
5. What is your marital status? (circle one) 
   
  Single (never married) Committed Relationship Married 
  Divorced  Separated  Widowed 
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6. What is your employment status? (circle one) 
  Employed for wages  Self-employed  A homemaker 
  Out-of-work & looking for work Out-of-work & not looking for work 
  
  Student Military Retired Unable to work 
7. Is English your first language? (circle one) 
  Yes  No 
  If no, how long have you been speaking, reading, and writing in English? 
   (please write)  ________________ years. 
8. What subject do you currently teach? (circle all that apply) 
  Language Arts  Math  Science  
   
  Social Studies  Art  Physical Education 
  Other (please write) __________________ 
9. How many years of teaching experience in an elementary and/or secondary school do you 
have? 
  





Multivariate tests of importance ratings for attributes for general population versus teacher 
participants and preservice versus inservice teacher participants 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
MANOVA Value F Hypothesis df Error df p
Intercept
Pillai’s Trace 0.987 457.327 15 87 0.000
Wilks’ Lambda 0.013 457.327 15 87 0.000
Hotelling’s 
Trace 78.849 457.327 15 87 0.000
Group
Pillai’s Trace 0.553 2.239 30 176 0.001***
Wilks’ Lambda 0.503 2.376 30 174 0.000***
Hotelling’s 
Trace 0.876 2.511 30 172 0.000***
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Table 16. 
Multivariate tests comparing groups on fixed-mindset score (“Fixed-General”) from Dweck’s 
Theories of Intelligence Survey and modified domain-specific subscale scores 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
MANOVA Value F Hypothesis df Error df p
Intercept
Pillai’s Trace 0.807 137.940 3 99 0.000
Wilks’ Lambda 0.193 137.940 3 99 0.000
Hotelling’s Trace 4.180 137.940 3 99 0.000
Group
Pillai’s Trace 0.263 5.047 6 200 0.000***
Wilks’ Lambda 0.737 5.434 6 198 0.000***
Hotelling’s Trace 0.356 5.816 6 196 0.000***
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Table 17. 
Multivariate tests comparing preservice versus inservice teacher participants on fixed-mind-
set scores (“Fixed-General”) from Dweck’s Theories of Intelligence Survey and modified 
domain-specific subscale scores, by domain 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
MANOVA Value F Hypothesis df Error df p
Domains
Pillai’s Trace 0.174 4.315 2 41 0.020*
Wilks’ Lambda 0.826 4.315 2 41 0.020*
Hotelling’s 
Trace 0.211 4.315 2 41 0.020*
Domains*Group
Pillai’s Trace 0.032 0.683 2 41 0.511
Wilks’ Lambda 0.968 0.683 2 41 0.511
Hotelling’s 
Trace 0.033 0.683 2 41 0.511
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Table 19. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity of Dweck’s Theories of Intelligence Survey (Dweck, 1999) and 
modified domain-specific items For preservice and inservice teacher participants 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
Within-Subjects 
Effect Mauchly’s W Chi-Square df p
Domains 0.992 0.327 2 0.849
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Table 20. 
MANOVA tests of within-subjects effect comparing preservice versus inservice teacher par-
ticipants on fixed-mindset scores (“Fixed-General”) from Dweck’s Theories of Intelligence 
Survey and modified domain-specific subscale scores, by domain 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05




Sphericity Assumed 1.178 2 0.589 4.762 0.011*
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.178 1.984 0.593 4.762 0.011*
Huynh-Feldt 1.178 2 0.589 4.762 0.011*
Domains*Group
Sphericity Assumed 0.161 2 0.080 0.650 0.525
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.161 1.984 0.081 0.650 0.524
Huynh-Feldt 0.161 2 0.080 0.650 0.525
Error (Subjects)
Sphericity Assumed 10.385 84 0.124
Greenhouse-Geisser 10.385 83.338 0.125
Huynh-Feldt 10.385 84 0.124
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Table 25. 





Math Scenario  
Response 1
Math Scenario  
Response 2





Using Alex’s strength 
to develop his 
weakness
To find a way to reach 
Alex’s potential 
through path that is 
comfortable for him.
For example, I would 
give Alex a poem with 
5 syllables per line and 
say: “Could you count 
the total number of 
syllables in this 
poem?” “Do you 
notice the rhyme ‘ee’ 
keep appearing on 
syllable 5, 10, 15 …?”
A1 
D10
I would encourage him 
to explore the concepts 
at his own pace and 
remind him of where 
he excels giving him 
time from other 
activities to explore 
these patterns
It puts little pressure 
on a student who is 
clearly doing well and 
gives him the extra 
time to find how he 
makes sense of the 
patterns.
“You’re such an 
excellent writer that 
you’ve already 
finished this 
assignment! Great job. 
Maybe we could take 
out the manipulative 
with this extra time 
you have and you 




I would tell Alex that 
we all learn at different 
levels and that we 
could meet for a 
special fun session that 
included word 
problems
He is a reader and 
writer so may respond 
better to words.
“We all work at 
different paces Alex. 
You read faster than a 
lot of your classmates 
and are a great team 
player. Taking extra 
time on your math is 
like the other kids 





Ask Alex how he feels 
about math and why 
make suggestions for 
help I could offer and 
let him choose what he 
thinks will help most
Give him agency in 
improving his own 
learning.
“How is math class 
going?” or “I can work 
with you one-on-one, 
in a small group, 
afterschool, or 
recommend you to 
tutoring, what do you 
think would help you 
most?”
A1
I would ask Alex to 
finish it at his own 
time
Some people are better 
at other intelligences 
such as creative or 
verbal and are slower 
in some, such as 
maths.
“Alex, take your time 
to finish these 
multiplication subs. It 









Ask Alex about his 
experience and his 
self-perception, try to 
identify the source of 
his confusion, present 
material in a different 
way.
Alex’s self-efficacy 
may be influencing his 
performance. Having 
content presente 
differently may better 
suit his learning style 
in math.
"I want to get a sense 
of what your 
experience in math has 
been so far this year so 
that I can figure out 
how to best support 
you. [Conversation 
using some of these 
questions: Is math hard 
for you? Do you enjoy 
math? What do you 
think are your 
strengths and 
weaknesses in math? 
Do you think it would 
help if another student 
worked with you and 
explained the material 




Modeling the patterns 
with different real-life 
manipulatives. 
Scaffolding and also 




strategies always help 
to aide in instruction 
and learning.
The harder he tries and 
the more he practices 
the better and more 




I would give Alex a 
number grid/line to 
help with skip-
counting and come up 
with a sing-song like 
method for each one 
his struggling with.
I feel seeing (# line) 
and hearing (sing 
song) will allow Alex 
to use more of his 
senses, which in turn 
could help him 
memorize and 
remember the counts.
I see your having some 
trouble remember the 
counts for 5’s and 10’s. 
I had this trouble in 
2nd grade too. This is 
what helped me 
*explain the above* 





I would have Alex use 
flash cards instead of 
patterns to allow him 
to memorize his facts. 
I might also find books 
that are about 
multiplication and 
division. I would also 
partner him up with 
other students to help 
with activities.
If he needs to learn 
multiplication and 
division and cannot 
pick up on the 
patterns, I would try a 
different way to teach 
him his facts. Using a 
book might help him 
better understand 
because he likes 
reading.
I would read the books 
to the class. I would 
basically tell Alex that 
he is going to work 
with a partner on this 
math skills (skip 
counting patterns). 
Also, I would give him 
flash cards to practice 
at home or with a 




Talk to Alex about 
growth mindset.
Since certain skills 
(reading/writing) seem 
to have come more 
easily to him, he might 
think that he will 
always be good at 
some things and not at 
others.
I would talk about 
growth vs. fixed 
mindset and explain 
how studies show that 
we can learn new 
skills in any area at 
any age. I would 
emphasise the fact that 
everyone has different 
strengths and 
challenges and ask 
Alex what strengths 
and/or skills he thinks 
he has that could help 


















Finding out what make 
Chris not doing the 
homework.
Knowing how and 
why the student 
behave is an important 
part of providing 
solution,
“I saw you look 
outside the window 
during our geography 
discussion, could you 
tell me what you were 
thinking then?” or “Is 
there any reasons that 
you would like me to 
know to explain why 
you did not do your 
homework?”
C8
Find a scientific 
experiment that 
interests her that is 
more complex.
She’s bored. I hated 
doing homework when 
I understood the 
subject matter too 
well.
“You seem bored with 
what we’re doing … I 






I would ask Chris if 
anything was the 
matter because I know 
he is so much better 
about finishing 
assignments.
He may be going 
through something 
personal so as the 
teacher I should be 
sensitive and build up 
his self-esteem to 
address the problem.
“Chris, I would love to 
take time out of my 
lunch so that I can give 
you extra practice 
game. You are so great 
at this material that I 




Compliment Chris and 
try to offer increased 
challenges to keep him 
engaged.
All students need to be 
challenged and should 
be in the zone of 
proximal development 
(high support, high 
challenge).
“I’ve noticed you seem 
bored in class. What 
topics interest you 
most in science? 
Instead of completing 
the class homework 
that is too easy for 
you, I want you to do x 
assignment/project so 
that you continue to 
develop your scientific 
inquiry skills.”
A3
I would instill the 
importance of 
homework in Chris’s 
mind.
She does not feel 
homework is 
important at all.
“Homework is a part 
of class work. It is 
given so it reinforces 







Speak with Chris 
about her experiences 
in science and try to 
gauge her interest.
Chris may not feel 
challenged and/or may 
not be interested in the 
content of the class / 
have a way to bring in 
her own interests 
(since she is a strong 
reader/writer and has 
demonstrated 
understanding).
“What has your 
experience been in 
science? Do you enjoy 
it? Is it challenging for 
you? Do you find the 
topics interesting? are 
there topics you would 




Perhaps Chris is not 
being challenged 
enough. I would 
modify instruction for 






First, why isn’t your 
homework being 
done? Homework is 
independent practice 
and must be completed 
to gain the knowledge 
of the lessons. If 
you’re bored, I can 
challenge you to be 
better.
A3
Positive reward sticker 
chart and fast finisher 
folder.
To help Chris stay 
focused in class and 
motivated to do 
homework.
Chris, I know you’re 
very bright so I’m a 
little worried that 
you’re not doing your 
homework and seem 
bored in class. To help 
you, I’m going to give 
you chart in your 
folder and every day 
you do your 
homework you’ll get a 
sticker. Five stickers = 
homework pass. I’ll 
also give you a fast 
finisher folder to work 
on when you finish 
your work so your 
brain stays challenged! 
C8
Honestly, I probably 
wouldn’t worry about 
homework so much 
(but I’m not big on 
homework), especially 
if she is doing well - 
missing a couple 
assignments isn’t a big 
deal. I might give her 
advanced work during 
class because she 
might be bored 
because she can handle 
harder work.
She seems advanced 
and can be bored 
because it’s too easy.
Chris, you are doing 
really well in class and 
I would like to give 








Chris may feel that he 
is smart and therefore 
doesn’t need to put in 
a lot of effort.
I would discuss growth 
mindset and remind 
Chris that he can 
always learn more or 
improve his skills in 
an area. Iw ould tray to 
have hi generate ideas 
for how he could push 
his learning and be 
more engaged. Maybe 
he would want to 
study a topic in more 


















Using more tangible 
(like story blocks) or 
visual (like mapping) 
to help Sam grasp the 
writing strategies.
Using something that 
might be more 
concrete to Sam.
“Sam, imagine that 
you are a tiny human 
walking through all the 
giant blocks … The 
first block is called 
‘introduction’ where 
you want your reader 
picture your story in 
30 seconds.”
A1 Let him write about what he wants.
He may be associating 
the content of the task 
with stress, and 
spicing up what he can 




"Sam, it seems like 
you’re not too crazy 
about writing. What do 
you want to write 
about? You can even 




Ask Sam his favorite 
topic and say, “let’s 
write about it!”
Sometimes you need 
to find a topic to hook 
the student.
"Sam, I hear you like 
cars! At lunch today, I 
want to show you 
some cool new ones I 
bought for the 
classroom and maybe 
you can help me write 
directions on how the 
class should play with 
them? Since you know 
so much about them.”
A4 Offer more scaffolding and support for Sam.
She’s getting 
discouraged because 
she is not receiving the 
support she needs to 
succeed at the task.
“When writing your 
journal entries, try 
using the following 
sentence frames. What 
are your ideas for [the 
journal or the essay]? 
How can you use these 




Use the excitement as 
energy, or as a 
motivator to do well in 




“Sam, go through your 












Sam may be reluctant 
because writing is hard 
for him due to 
underlying difficulties.
“What was it like 
writing this journal 
entry? Could you tell 
me about what you’ve 




Eliminate coping work 
whenever you can. 
Coping is the hardest 
thing for them to do 
when they don’t like 
writing. Provide notes 
and modeled examples 
for students to read.
Sam needs more 
confidence in his 
writing. By reading 
modeled examples, he 
will learn the correct 
formats for writing.
I would explain that 
writing is a process 
and it can be learned 
productively.
A2
Show Sam other 
students’ work and 
explain the 
components she’s not 
understanding.
I feel it’s important to 
model the correct form 
for Sam.
Sam your writing is 
really creative. I 
noticed however 
you're confused about 
the essay components. 
Let me show you Ben 
and Sara’s. I’d point 
out parts of these 
students’ to show Sam 




I would provide Sam 
with extra help during 
writing.
Because he is having a 
hard time and it would 
help me understand 
why and would give 
him time to get better.
Sam, let’s practice 
writing a journal entry. 





Goal setting and 
growth mindset.
To support Sam in 
seeing his own 
progress.
I would ask Sam what 
challenges he was 
having with writing 
and what supports he 
may need. I would try 
to provide him ih 
additional support, set 
manageable goals for 
him (i.e., write 1/4 
page journal entry/
week) and help him 
track his progress, 
celebrate, and adjust 




Between-subjects special contrasts of attributes for general population versus teacher partic-
ipants, general population college graduate sub-sample versus teacher participants, and pre-
service versus inservice teacher participants 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
Contrasts
Teachers VS.  
General Population




t p t p t p
Rational / Logical / Analytical -3.673 0.000*** -2.776 0.007** 0.166 0.867
Open / Flexible / Learns from 
mistakes 0.707 0.478 1.721 0.090 -0.260 0.795
Creative 1.081 0.282 1.841 0.070 -1.684 0.095
Good Communication / Social 
skills 2.215 0.029* 1.901 0.061 -1.737 0.086
Thoughtful 1.362 0.177 2.000 0.049* -0.347 0.728
Self-awareness / 
Metacognition 1.772 0.064 2.496 0.015* 1.014 0.313
Knowledgeable -2.786 0.006** -2.000 0.05* 0.214 0.832
Quick- thinking -3.118 0.002** -3.345 0.001*** 1.363 0.176
Practical 1.026 0.308 0.945 0.348 -0.418 0.676
Curious / Loves to learn -0.637 0.526 -0.427 0.669 -1.598 0.114
Motivated / Perseverance 0.917 0.361 1.406 0.164 0.202 0.839
Well-rounded 0.897 0.373 0.240 0.810 -1.090 0.278
Problem-solving skills -1.896 0.061 -1.756 0.084 0.010 0.992
Subject-specific skills -2.043 0.044* -2.305 0.024* -0.893 0.375
Good memory -2.928 0.004** -1.905 0.061 0.824 0.411
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Table 33. 
Between-subjects special contrasts of attributes for original preservice versus inservice 
teacher participants and redefined new novice versus experienced teacher participants 
***Significance after Bonferroni correction p < .05/15 = .003 
Contrasts




t p t p
Rational / Logical / Analytical 0.166 0.867 0.891 0.376
Open / Flexible / Learns from mistakes -0.260 0.795 -0.968 0.334
Creative -1.684 0.095 -2.997 0.003***
Good Communication / Social skills -1.737 0.086 -1.184 0.239
Thoughtful -0.347 0.728 -0.139 0.890
Self-awareness / Metacognition 1.014 0.313 0.567 0.573
Knowledgeable 0.214 0.832 2.273 0.025
Quick- thinking 1.363 0.176 -0.231 0.819
Practical -0.418 0.676 -2.190 0.031
Curious / Loves to learn -1.598 0.114 -2.397 0.018
Motivated / Perseverance 0.202 0.839 -1.000 0.321
Well-rounded -1.090 0.278 -0.963 0.338
Problem-solving skills 0.010 0.992 -0.902 0.370
Subject-specific skills -0.893 0.375 0.241 0.809
Good memory 0.824 0.411 -0.209 0.835
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